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Law and Development
Comparative Law

as Anti-

JedidiahKroncke*

ABSTRACT

This Article asserts that during the twentieth century,
American law has predominantly structured its relationship to
foreign legal experience through a set of ideas and practices
known as "law and development," which is irredeemably
antithetical to the practice of comparative law. Centrally, law
and development is built on the assumption that American law
can be exported abroad to catalyze foreign legal development.
The dismal record of such efforts has remained paradoxically
popular while the field remains locked in repeating cycles of
failure and optimism.
This Article demonstrates that the history of law and
development's failures is far older than has been traditionally
recognized, and dates back to the turn of the twentieth century.
In this era, foreign reform became a key part of the professional
image of the modern American lawyer. At the same time, the
origins of law and development were intimately tied to the
decline of comparative law in American legal culture. This
history reveals that the paradox of law and development's
contemporarypopularity can only be understood by recognizing
the cultural politics that these developments embedded in the
American legal community. The troubling legacy of this widely
entrenched view of America as solely an exporter of legal
knowledge presents pressing liabilities for American law, both
internationally and domestically, on the competitive terrain of
the twenty-first century.
This Article concludes that in order to address these
liabilities, America should categorically abandon law and
development and should fundamentally reorient its relationship
* Senior Research Scholar, East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. J.D.
Yale, Ph.D. UC Berkeley. Earlier drafts of this paper and related research were greatly
improved by various workshop participants during my tenure as a Ruebhausen Fellow
at Yale, Golieb Fellow at NYU, and Berger Fellow at Harvard. For their specific
feedback, I am most indebted to William Alford, Marc Arkin, Ash Bali, Robert Berring,
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Ugo Mattei, Bill Nelson, Intisar Rabb, Aziz Rana, Jeff Redding, Teemu Ruskola, and
Frank Upham.
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to foreign legal experience through a self-interested practice of
comparative law. As exemplified in the debate over judicial
citation of foreign precedents, this shift will require basic
changes in how American legislative and administrative bodies
relate to foreign law, as well as the place of comparative law in
American law schools. Such a reorientationwill enable America
to strategically perceive foreign legal developments and, most
critically, productively adapt foreign legal experience as an
energizing stimulant to our own legal innovation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ..............................................................
CANNOT BE LEARNED ....................................................

482

A.
B.

483

C.
III.

Defining Law and Development .........................
The Unending Synergy of Critique and
Op timism .............................................................
The PersistentCycles of Contemporary
Law and Development ........................................

ANTI-COMPARATIVE LAW ..............................................

B.
C.

The Early Twentieth Century Birth of
Law and Development ........................................
America's First Wave of Law and
Development Goes Global ...................................
The Cultural Politicsof Law and
Develop m ent ........................................................

DEVELOPMENT'S MIRRORED LENS ................................

B.
C.

500

501
505
515

Accepting the Limits of American Legal
ExpertiseA broad.................................................
Authoritarianismand Recognizing
Unintended Consequences ..................................
Blinding Reformers, Blinding Ourselves ..........

520

520
522
529

THE DOMESTIC LIABILITIES OF ANTICOM PARATIVISM ............................................................

A.
B.
C.
VI.

492

THE INTERNATIONAL LIABILITIES OF LAW AND

A.

V.

484

THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AS

A.

IV.

479

THE PARADOXES OF A HISTORY WHOSE LESSONS

IgnoringForeign Legal Experience in an
Age of Common Legal Problems ........................
Foreign Citation and the Legacy of
Anti-Comparativism...........................................
Abandoning Law and Development,
Reviving Comparative Law ................................

C ONCLU SION ..................................................................

535
535
539
544
552

2012]

LA WAND DEVELOPMENTAS ANTI-COMPARATIVE LAW

479

I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the past decade, an increasing amount of energy has
been devoted to debates over the role of "foreign law" in the American
legal system. In both public and academic circles, these debates have
primarily focused on the appropriateness of judicial citation to foreign
precedents or the enforcement of foreign law in contracts or arbitral
arrangements. 1 These debates have generated a great deal of heat,
but little in the realm of practical lawmaking-displaying more the
characteristics of identity politics than serious inquiry. Moreover, in
this furor, the actual state of comparative law in America has been
elided more often than not.
Consider how the average American lawyer, or even average
American citizen, interacts with and thinks about foreign legal
systems. Is it through recounting the foreign influences that shaped
early American legal thinking? Is it through public debate on the
utility of foreign legal innovations or their relationship to our
particular set of legal values and commitments? Or is it instead
through the recounting of the inefficiencies of rival industrialized
nations and the injustices of those systems deemed "developing?"
From bar association programs to law school colloquia, American
lawyers are consistently presented with the infirmities of foreign
law-even in our own times of domestic crisis-and American citizens
are inundated with a mythologized past and noble present of
Americans working privately and publicly to reshape foreign legal
systems.
Thus, in contrast to even the most cosmopolitan sentiments
expressed in American law today, the intellectual and attitudinal
terms on which American lawyers and legal institutions relate to
most foreign legal systems are dominated by what has come over the
past half-century to be known as "law and development." Although
not without its own internal diversity, law and development is built
upon the deeply ingrained notion that America is solely an exporter of
legal knowledge and, further, that American lawyers and legal
institutions can be the altruistic catalysts of positive legal
development abroad.2 The panoply of American private and public
international legal reform projects is the most pervasive driver by
which assumptions about foreign legal systems have been shaped and
3
sustained for the modern American lawyer.

1.
See infra Part V.B (discussing the debate over judicial citation to foreign
authorities).
2.
For a taxonomic overview of law and development approaches, see
generally Mariana Prado, What Is Law & Development?, 11 REV. ARG. TEORIA JURIDICA
1 (2010) (Arg.).
3.
This Article is unconcerned with other countries that engage in what could
be described as law and development work. The degree to which law and development
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This Article demonstrates that beyond the relatively narrow
terms of current debates about foreign law in America, the
persistence of law and development has directly led to the
marginalization of American comparative law in the past century. In
the most direct sense, law and development operates as a form of
anti-comparative law in American legal culture. The very
methodological and conceptual struggles with which comparative
lawyers grapple form the exact, nonrevisable presumptions of law
and development as an applied field of legal action-from the
intimacy of law and politics to the complexities of legal change.
Furthermore, the history of law and development is far longer and
more problematic than is generally acknowledged. Not only was the
rise of law and development in the early twentieth century
intertwined with the general decline of comparative law, but at the
time, its rise stood in stark contrast to our relative pre-twentieth
century legal cosmopolitanism.
Although evaluated by sometimes searching external and
internal critiques, law and development has shown an inability to
learn from its own history and to transcend the presumptions
inherent in the idea of America as an exporter of legal knowledge.
Throughout the twentieth century, American legal reform efforts
abroad have consistently failed to justify their continued popularity,
with perhaps the worst record within the already dismal record of
international development efforts more broadly. Even today, when
there is a rhetorical convergence across the globe regarding legal
ideals such as the rule of law, spare empirical evidence exists to
substantiate any consistent or predictable impact of American reform
efforts on foreign legal development. As this Article ultimately
concludes, law and development and its persistent popularity is best
understood not as a critical field of inquiry and action, but as a form
of cultural identity politics.
Yet, throughout the twentieth century and continuing today,
even those who have held themselves out as cosmopolitan promoters
of foreign law in America consistently, if not enthusiastically,
participate in efforts to shape foreign legal development that

ideas have spread from America to other nations, have separate origins in Europe, or
have migrated into putatively international organizations like the World Bank or IMF
is tangential to how America should ideally relate to foreign legal systems. At a
minimum, the prevalence of law and development elsewhere is far from as central and
extensive as in American law, and to whatever degree it exists elsewhere, all to the
detriment of those legal cultures. See generally Ian Manners & Richard G. Whitman,
The Difference Engine: Constructing and Representing the InternationalIdentity of the
European Union, 10 J. EUR. PUB. POLY 380 (2003) (discussing the development of the
European Union's international identity); Klaus A. Ziegert, With Law the Land Shall
Be Built: The Case of Changing Norms Seriously, in LAW AND LEGAL CULTURE IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 142 (Gunther Doeker-Mach & Klaus A. Ziegert eds., 2004)
(addressing law and development efforts by Nordic countries).
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reinforce the parochial attitudes they seek to combat domestically.
Current debates only hint indirectly at the serious present and future
liabilities that the persistence of law and development presents for
the American legal community, which subsume but go far beyond
current concerns over foreign law in American legal culture. 4 The
consequences of law and development as anti-comparative law are
increasingly felt both internationally in our inability to strategically
evaluate foreign legal developments, and more significantly in our
domestic inability to productively utilize foreign legal experience.
Even at the most routine and technical levels where American
lawyers increasingly encounter foreign law in this global age, the
concerns of law and development are at best orthogonal, and at worst
countervailing.
These liabilities are relevant to any debate over the place of
America in the shifting tides of global politics. Just as the global
order shifted in our favor over the course of the twentieth century, it
is shifting again in the twenty-first century toward greater parity and
competition. The shrinking terms of twentieth century geopolitics
reached their apex in the brief unipolar American moment of the
post-Cold War decade, but they have quickly expanded into an
increasingly multi-polar order in which America's place is now
uncertain. Consider not only China, but the rising prominence of
countries including India, Brazil, and Russia, and it becomes plain
that in the twenty-first century, we can no longer afford to hold onto
the same stagnating twentieth century attitudes about our inherent
legal superiority.
Thirty years ago, comparative law legend Eric Stein declared,
"[T]he time has come for the American institutions concerned with
law revision and for the legislatures at the state and federal levels to
institutionalize and make systematic the study of foreign legal
solutions. '5 Comparative lawyers like Stein have long chastised
American presumptions about foreign legal knowledge and warned
that such conceit would eventually undermine our competitive
position. 6 Such warnings continue to go unheeded.

4.
See infra Part V.B.
5.
Eric Stein, Uses, Misuses-And Nonuses of ComparativeLaw, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 198, 216 (1977).
6.
Id. For other articulations of the advantages of comparative approaches,
see ERIC FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN 164 (2000) ("One of the most
compelling reasons to research other legal and social systems is that it opens up a new
window onto one's own system."), Clark D. Cunningham, Why American Lawyers
Should Go to India: Retracing Galanter's Intellectual Odyssey, 16 LAw & SOC. INQUIRY
777 (1991), and Hugh Scogin, Civil "Law" in Traditional China, in CIVIL LAW IN QING
AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 41 (Kathryn Bernhardt & Philip Huang eds., 1994) ("The
result can be a fuller appreciation of the range of law applications in a variety of
human experience.").
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To substantiate the claim that law and development is a form of
anti-comparative law, this Article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines
the cyclical pattern of failure that characterizes law and
development's applied and theoretical endeavors-cycles that
illustrate how the paradigm's presumptions undermine its ability to
function as a productive site of learning about foreign law. Part III
shows how current scholarship has missed the deeper history of law
and development's role in the development of modern American law
during the early twentieth century transformation, when it became
both central to the modern self-image of the American legal
profession, and also facilitated the progressive marginalization of
comparative law in American legal culture. Part IV explores how the
ingrained presumptions of law and development present liabilities for
American lawyers in the international arena, warping our ability to
understand foreign legal developments on their own terms-most
notably in authoritarian regimes-and undermining our ability to
productively engage with foreign lawyers seeking to learn from our
own historical experiences. Part V argues that the most pressing
liabilities of law and development as anti-comparative law are
counter-intuitively domestic in nature-liabilities foreshadowed, but
vastly overemphasized in the judicial realm. This Part further argues
that America has lost its ability to integrate foreign legal experience
into its own legal development, often attempting to solve problems
abroad that are still without clear resolution at home. This Article
concludes not by calling for a retreat from international legal
engagement, but for a self-interested reinvigoration of comparative
law within our legislative and administrative bodies and through
reforms in American legal education.

II. THE PARADOXES OF A HISTORY WHOSE LESSONS
CANNOT BE LEARNED

This Part summarily describes the current state of law and
development as a field of legal inquiry and practice. This practice has,
in recent history, evidenced a paradoxical disconnect between its
consistently dismal track record of catalyzing positive developments
in foreign legal systems with the level of popular and academic
support for such efforts. In different decades and in varied
geographical settings, law and development has been unable to
transcend its violation of the classic challenges of comparative law:
formalism, instrumentalism, and idealization. After defining what
constitutes "law and development," this Part will show that the
persistence of this paradox has an internal structure characterized by
a repeating cycle that includes first recognizing these failures, then
producing searching but delimited self-critiques, and finally
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A. Defining Law and Development
The argument that law and development operates as a form of
anti-comparative law in American legal culture requires an
understanding of what defines law and development as an academic
or practical field of law. As noted in the introduction, there is a wide
range of public and private programs directed by American lawyers
throughout the world that attempt to impact legal development with
regional and national foci. The shape of these programs varies widely
and they draw on American lawyers from across contrasting political
and legal philosophies-from rule of law initiatives staffed by
volunteers from the American Bar Association, to USAID access to
7
justice programs staffed by short- and long-term contract workers.
Parallel to this diversity are law and development theorists who both
evaluate such work and propose broad frameworks for thinking about
how to impact foreign legal development.8 Among such practitioners
and theorists, there are many who would claim to actively practice
comparative law. However, the traditional difficulties with which
comparative lawyers have struggled-the unavoidable intimacy of
law and politics, the pitfalls of cross-cultural formalism, and the
fallacy of implicit or idealized comparison-are ineluctable
characteristics of law and development as a field.
These disparate actors are tied together under the rubric of law
and development in two ways: a sense of altruistic contribution to
foreign legal development and a reference to a shared set of legal
ideals that seeks to differentiate such work from direct political
advocacy, most notably "the rule of law."9 Some of the core debates
within law and development reflect the difficulty in formulating clear
and precise definitions of these two components, namely, how one
defines and measures such "contribution," and what ideals-such as
the rule of law-mean in concrete terms.

7.
For an overview of this diversity in China, see Funding the Rule of Law
and Civil Society, CHINA RTS. F. (Human Rights China, New York, N.Y.), no. 3, 2003, at
22.
8.
See, e.g., Symposium, The Future of Law and Development, 104 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 164 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/priorcolloquies/future-of-law-and-development.html.
9.
See generally RECRAFTING THE RULE OF LAW (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999);
BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW (2004); Upendra Baxi, Rule of Law in India:

Theory and Practice, in ASIAN DISCOURSES ON RULE OF LAW 324 (Randall Peerenboom
ed., 2004); David Clark, The Many Meanings of the Rule of Law, in LAW, CAPITALISM
AND POWER IN ASIA 28 (Kanishka Jayasuirya ed., 1999). For one fifty-year old effort,
see INT'L COMM'N OF JURISTS, THE RULE OF LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1959).
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Nevertheless, one of the most notable characteristics of law and
development is how it has accommodated and united a wide-range of
support under ever-morphing legal ideals, including human rights,
more
and legal internationalism
sustainable development,
generally. 10 While most law and development work was traditionally
predicated on the consent of those nations "in development," the
recent American military interventions in the Middle East have given
rise to new and presumptively fertile grounds for law and
development work with much greater involvement by the American
military." What has been primarily excluded from this definition of
law and development are the many natural legal diffusions that have
practice by
resulted from the competitive pressures on foreign legal 12
virtue of America's global political and economic influence.
B. The Unending Synergy of Critique and Optimism
What is initially so striking about the literature on law and
development is its consistent and ever-present self-critique. At both
the theoretical and operational level, very little is written on foreign

See David Trubek & Alvaros Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in
10.
Law and Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 7-13 (David Trubek & Alvaros Santos eds.,
2006) (describing the "Third Moment" in law and development theory that "accepts the
use of law not only to create and protect markets, but also to curb market excess,
support the social, and provide direct relief to the poor"); Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism
and Constitutionalism,79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971 (2004) (discussing law and development
in the context of legal internationalism); Philippe Sands, InternationalCourts and the
Application of the Concept of "SustainableDevelopment," in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:
FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 132, 132-35 (John Hatchard & Amanda
Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003). See generallyRandall Peerenboom, Varieties of Rule of Law:
An Introduction and Provisional Conclusion, in ASIAN DISCOURSES ON RULE OF LAW,
supra note 9, at 1-55 (discussing the many meanings people have given to the "rule of
law").
Thomas B. Nachbar, Defining the Rule of Law Problem, 12 GREEN BAG 2D
11.
303, 306 (2009); see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence,
Norms, and the "Rule of Law," 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2279 (2003) (noting the
increasing role for U.S., UN, and NATO peacekeeping forces in promoting rule of law
principles); Jason Brownlee, Imperial Designs and EmpiricalDilemmas: Why ForeignLed State Building Fails 1 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., & the Rule of Law, Working
Paper No. 40, 2005) (discussing the difficulties with nation-building in the context of
contemporary military interventions).
This transnational influence followed American economic power and spread
12.
forms of American legal practice across the globe as part of the competitive dynamics of
international legal practice. See generally Volkmar Gessner et al., Introduction: The
Legal Culture of Global Business Transactions,in RULES AND NETWORKS 1, 6 (Richard
P. Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001) (noting the hegemony of western rational-legal
institutions and values); Vittorio Olgiati, Process and Policy of Legal
Professionalization in Europe: The Deconstruction of a Normative Order, in
PROFESSIONAL COMPETITION AND PROFESSIONAL POWER 170, 188-89 (Yves Dezalay &
David Sugarman eds., 1995) (describing how American legal practices have spread
across the globe).
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reform efforts that is not at some point reflective and inclusive of
"lessons learned." Yet, herein lies the central paradox of law and
development-the continued and intransigent popularity of its efforts
despite its equally intransigent track record of failure. 13 At the most
fundamental level, there is little empirical evidence that establishes
accepted models for foreign legal reform efforts or establishes a link
between such efforts and economic or political change. 14 Even beyond
this lack of current empirical certainty, there is little consensus on
15
systemized metrics for such evaluations.
The mainstream of law and development thus works at a
peculiar intersection. At this intersection, unending attempts to
establish the conceptual and substantive terms by which foreign
reform projects contribute to positive legal development abroad merge
with various articulations of generalized optimism. Tying together
these intertwined critical and uncritical elements of the field is an
unquestioned sense of purpose or mission given rise to by law and
development's altruistic intentions-intentions that are often felt in
quite personal terms by many practitioners and theorists. 16 Faced
with perpetual failure, these participants fervently rebound to a faith
that their mission is good and, thus, failure is only an ever-unfolding
invitation for further improvement.
Turning then to the internal structure of this cyclical paradox,
three broad and foundational critiques bind together the operational
and theoretical evaluations of law and development efforts:
instrumentalism, formalism, and idealization.
Critiques of instrumentalism reflect a consistent aspiration to
divorce legal reform work abroad from politics, and the desire to
portray such work as either technocratic or derived from a set of

13.
The language of paradox is not completely novel as a way to describe the
state of affairs within law and development. See Bryant G. Garth, Building Strong and
Independent JudiciariesThrough the New Law and Development: Behind the Paradox
of Consensus Programsand PerpetuallyDisappointingResults, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 383,
383 (2002) (writing about law and development's "Paradox of... Perpetuating
Disappointing Results").
14.
See Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C. Heller, Introduction to BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 1, 1-4 (Erik Jensen &
Thomas Heller eds., 2003).
15.
See Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law VariableTell Us About Rule of
Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 145-48 (2004) (raising methodological concerns
about measures of development); David Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators:
Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going, 23 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (2008)
(presenting a framework for assessing progress in measuring development). For ongoing
work in this area, see Indicators as a Global Technology/Governance by Information
Project, INST. FOR INT'L L. & JUST., http://iilj.org/research/IndicatorsProject.asp (last
visited Mar. 1, 2012).
16.
See, e.g., Jayanath Krishnan, Academic SAILERS: The Ford Foundation
and the Efforts to Shape Legal Education in Africa, 1957-1977, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
(forthcoming 2012) (describing the deep concern of one group of practitioners that their
efforts be understood as nonimperialism and altruistic).
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universal legal best practices. 17 Most often this presumption is
considered necessary to escape claims of political advocacy or cultural
imperialism.' 8 It is often coupled with the presumption that the
potential adoption of more sophisticated legal forms is an innately
positive development, and that some form of broad consensus exists
about what constitutes positive legal change in any given field.19
There is perhaps no harsher critic of this presumption than David
Kennedy, who has repeatedly noted and noted the pitfalls of such
20
apolitical views of legal change and universal legal consensus.
Not only does this dichotomy between law and politics chafe
against practitioners' own evaluations of the highly politicized
reception of their work, 21 but this dichotomy reveals the reasons why
the classic concerns of comparative law directly conflict with the

17.
See Scott Newton, Post-Communist Legal Reform: The Elision of the
Political,in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra
note 10, at 161, 171 (noting how, even in transitional countries such as Kazakhstan,
rule of law promotion is carried out with an elision of the political in the mistaken
belief it can avoid the "messiness" of process); Marina Ottaway & Thomas Carothers,
Toward Civil Society Realism, in FUNDING VIRTUE 293, 296 (Marina Ottaway &
Thomas Carothers eds., 2000) ("[T]he assumption runs, donors can affect the political
development of recipient countries without ever directly intervening in politics.
Appealing as it sounds, the idea does not hold up in practice.").
18.
See, e.g., Krishnan, supra note 16.
19.
Michael Likosky, Introduction to TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES, at viii
(Michael Likosky ed., 2002). The most striking example of this fallacy is the World
Bank's move into rule of law promotion, which required an apolitical conceptualization
of rule of law promotion because of the bank's charter limitations. See Lawrence
Tshuma, The Political Economy of the World Bank's Legal Framework for Economic
Development, 8 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 76 (1999).
20.
See David Kennedy, 'Laws and Developments,' in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:
FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 10, at 17 ("The idea that
building 'the rule of law' might itself be a development strategy instead encourages the
hope that choosing law could substitute for the perplexing political and economic
choices which have been at the centre of development policy-making for half a
century."). Contra MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & RONALD DANIELS, RULE OF LAW REFORM
AND DEVELOPMENT 14 (2008) (claiming that global political consensus exists about
"optimal institutional arrangements"). See generally JAMES FERGUSON, THE ANTIPOLITICS MACHINE 13-15 (1994) ("[Plolitical economists are often too quick
to ... accept the premise that a 'development' project is primarily a device for bringing
about a particular sort of economic transformation .. "); DAVID KENNEDY, THE DARK
SIDES OF VIRTUE 112 (2004) (arguing that humanitarians are policy makers and the
view that there are international policy solutions to some problems is a downside to
humanitarian activities that is often ignored); David Kairys, Searchingfor the Rule of
Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307, 328 (2003) ('The undefined, overblown rule-of-law
notion inaccurately conveys that freedom, democracy, and equality will be or can be
reliably guaranteed by operation of law and irrespective of values or politics.").
21.
For example, this apolitical outlook is complicated by the activity of
diplomatic officials who often treat law and development programs as a chance to
develop personal influence. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD 277
(1999).
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aspirations of law and development. 22 Not only has comparative law
long struggled to place even discrete parts of larger legal systems
within their political context, but it is forever challenged by the
difficultly of drawing out and distinguishing the intimately bound
functional and expressive aspects of foreign legal experience. Perhaps
no other area of law and development has been so striking in this

respect than tax reform, which is at the very heart of society's most
fundamental articulations of its legal values and basic social
compromises.

23

In similar fashion, it is not surprising that the second recurrent
self-critique within law and development also parallels another
classic debate within comparative law: the pitfalls of cross-cultural
formalism. 24 Here, theorists repeatedly criticize the basic notion that
American legal models can be transferred nonproblematically into
foreign legal systems with often very different institutional and
jurisprudential logics, 25 especially to the extent that such
universalism has deemphasized specific knowledge of the legal
system in question. 26 This universalistic aspiration is evidenced by
attempts to create "handbooks" for practitioners,2 7 and the evercomplexifying "blueprints" offered by academic assessments. 28 Even
at the most basic level, differences between what constitutes a
"lawyer" or a "court" in a given foreign system are presumed by the
29
field to be global analogs of an ideal American prototype.
Sustaining these two problems is perhaps the most foundational
assumption of law and development work-that there is a known

22.
See REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE 343 (1995) (providing
an extensive overview of the Tibetan Buddhist law system and concluding the lack of
dualistic thinking in the Tibetan legal system makes it difficult for Western countries
to analyze).
23.
See Miranda Stewart, Introduction:New Research on Tax Law and Political
Institutions, in TAX LAW AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 3 (Miranda Stewart ed., 2006)
(explaining that tax policies depend heavily on the broader economic and social context
of the state).
24.
Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L.
REV. 1 (1974); see also PENELOPE NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS (2007)
(explaining the legal borrowing within the Vietnamese legal system and the downsides
to legal reforms borrowed from capitalist economies that are much different than the
Vietnamese system).
25.
Carothers notes the recurrent search for universal templates created where
the "false dream of science" holds out the plausibility of a generalizable model that is
easily and cheaply applied without specific knowledge of the country at issue. See
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 293.
26.
Stephen Golub, A House Without a Foundation,in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD 105, 106 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
27.
E.g., STUART S. NAGEL, HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL LEGAL POLICY (2000).
28.
See, e.g., JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? 85-133 (2006)
(creating a blueprint for governance after military intervention).
29.
Donald Clarke, Puzzling Observations in Chinese Law: When Is a Riddle
Just a Mistake?, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA'S LEGAL SYSTEM 93 (C. Stephen Hsu
ed., 2003).
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30
legal ideal to be transferred from American law to another country.
This is the fallacy of idealization. Perhaps what most directly sets law
and development and comparative law in conflict is the idea that our
legal institutions are not simply superior in some evolutionary sense,
but that the sources and causes of their domestic historical
development are clearly known with a high degree, of scientific
objectivity. In contrast, not only are the origins of many core
American legal institutions and practices still subject to intense
debate within legal history, but the ahistoricism of much law and
development work reflects a shallow understanding of the
complicated and rare occurrence of significant institutional legal
reform in American legal history. 31 As a result, the deficiencies of
foreign legal systems deemed in need of "development" are compared
not to the complexity of American legal experience, but to an
abstracted ideal which often reflects only one view among many
within American legal debates. This is not genuine comparison, but
rather implicit comparison.
It takes but a brief foray into the literature on law and
development to see how often these critiques and an array of other
"lessons learned" are repeated over time and in different geographic
settings. 32 However, even this consistent circularity has not gone
unnoticed by law and development's internal critiques, and many
longtime commentators have tried to discern the root cause of this
repetition of errors made and lessons learned. One scholar refers to
this phenomenon as a pattern of "discarded fads, crisscrossed by
swinging pendulums, and afflicted with frequent bouts of group
33
amnesia."
Some commentators have focused on linking this lack of learning
to the operational and financial contexts of most foreign reform

30.
See infra Part IV.C.
31.
Id.
32.
See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Primacy of Society and the Failures
of Law and Development, 44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 209, 209 (2011).
Efforts at law and development have failed for decades. The underlying
reasons for the failures have been understood just as long. Nevertheless, law
and development initiatives are proliferating, carrying on with similarly
unsuccessful projects and methods. Academic work on law and development
over the course of this same period has traveled full circle, ending up where it
began, even as the number of scholars engaged in the subject multiplies,
issuing an outpouring of books and articles. Billions of dollars and the efforts of
a multitude of dedicated individuals have been expended in pursuit of law and
development. If the reasons underlying the persistent failures are not
integrated into our understanding, law and development practitioners and
scholars will be standing in much the same place a generation hence.

Id.
33.
Thomas Carothers, Steps Toward Knowledge, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF
LAW ABROAD, supra note 26, at 327, 336.
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efforts. This search has led to a number of suggested explanations,
from the public defensiveness of practitioners over their failures, to
the self-referential and insular milieus of law and development
practitioners and scholars. 34 At the same time, the constant need for
fundraising and grant-writing for projects and research creates an
acute sensitivity to the public image of reform work and a well-known
need to affirm the legal idealism of public and private funders.3 5 As a
result, many project evaluations resemble public relations materials,
whereas more critical evaluations are kept internally.3 6 Other
analysts have focused on the institutional and operational logics of
reform projects themselves. Project funding is often based on
subcontracting that treats new information as a proprietary asset and
provides downward budgetary pressures on training costs and longterm investments, while leading to low levels of donor cooperation
37
and coordination.
Yet, whatever the source self-identified for this near ritualistic
repetition of past errors, participants in law and development
discourse consistently retreat to an almost fatalistic form of
optimism. The turn to optimism is justified by the assumption that
the mission is good, and thus pessimism or the abandonment of such
efforts is categorically off the table on moral or ethical terms.3 8 Even
those scholars who provide global and systemic catalogs of the failure
of reform efforts remain steadfastly invested in the existence of an

34.
Carothers points to a deeply defensive culture among practitioners that
constitutes a "discrete subculture" insulated within agencies. CAROTHERS, supra note
21, at 47. This defensiveness leads to a self-referential practice that resulted in
"anodyne lessons" based on limited self-critical assessment. Id. at 10. This
defensiveness is sustained by a strong sense of shared mission that is permeated by
"rosy assumptions," "missionary zeal," and a lack of self-doubt. Id. at 7-8; see also Eric
Jensen, The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse
Institutional Patterns and Reformers' Responses, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE:
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 14, at 336, 369 n.17
(describing this internal culture as a "self-lovefest").
35.
See, e.g., Mary McClymount, Preface to MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE, at vii
(Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds., 2000) ("By intention, [this] is more a studied
appreciation than a critical analysis."). Contra Stephen J. Golub, Democracy as
Development: A Case for Civil Society Assistance in Asia, in FUNDING VIRTUE, supra
note 17, at 151 (indicating that USAID often dictates the results to be achieved without
regard to the ideals of funding partners).
36.
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 1, 9 (noting the defensiveness of law and
development organizations when responding to media critiques and the suppression of
reports on internal corruption); Luis Salas, From Law and Development to Rule of Law:
New and Old Issues in Justice Reform in Latin America, in THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN
AMERICA 17, 35 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001).
37.
See generally WADE CHANNEL, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE,
LESSONS NOT LEARNED: PROBLEMS WITH WESTERN AID FOR LAW REFORM IN
POSTCOMMUNIST COUNTRIES (2005) (discussing these concerns in the context of legal
reform efforts in Eastern Europe).
38.
Carothers, supra note 33, at 337 (concluding that it is "worthwhile" and
"that something vital and dynamic lies at the root").
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inherent "learning curve" within law and development,3 9 where
current problems will yield empirical data to form the basis of everimproving future efforts. 40 Bound to this faith in gradual progress is
the pervasive use of conditional language that qualifies current
failures with projected successes based on any partially positive
indication in the moment. 4 1 However current efforts are eventually
justified, to reject the possibility of steady progress is equated with
accepting the injustices perceived abroad.4 2 It is notable in this
respect that very few who write about law and development are not
to
participants in foreign legal reform themselves, or do not continue
43
write about the subject after they have left such work behind.
This form of psychological resort reflects in part the reaction of
law and development to decidedly unfriendly evaluations by scholars
outside of the law. While law and development as a field has
remained relatively insulated from the critical social sciences, there is
a pervasive awareness among practitioners and scholars that their
work is considered a form of "legal imperialism" or adjunct to
"American empire" by some disciplines-notably legal sociology,

39.
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 331-33; see also PETER SCHRAEDER,
EXPORTING DEMOCRACY 235 (2002) ("Each wave of democratization.., has contributed
to the further strengthening of the international democratic context within which
individual democracy promotion policies are pursued.").
40.
See, e.g., Ann Seidman & Robert B. Seidman, Using Reason and Experience
to Draft Country-Specific Laws, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM
FOR INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 249, 251-52 (Ann
Seidman et al. eds., 1999) (using the problems of legislative drafting projects in
multiple countries as the basis for a problem-solving methodology).
41.
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 11, 304-08 (qualifying such progress as "not
dramatic, steady, or rapid," but insisting it will yield "modest results" as "speeding up a
moving train," "slowing the backward slides," and placing "extra straws on the camel's
back"); see also PER BERGLING, RULE OF LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 198
(2006) (suggesting that there is a need for patience for certain, basic rule of law reforms
to be successful).
42.
Hammergren writes that while few improvements have been realized
through past efforts, what has been learned will mean that future success will be "more
likely." LINN HAMMERGREN, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 315 (1998). She claims that there
has been a shift in the attitude of donor countries recognizing past logistical and
conceptual flaws. Id. at 297. This learning process will then help reformers lead foreign
countries toward "something approaching modernity" with "stable, relatively
irreversible, and generally beneficial" gains. Id. at 316. Her optimism is also
consistently paired with conditional language such as "there are signs" and "it
appears." Id. at 300. She further argues that to ignore this learning process, and do
"nothing," would be an "enormous injustice." Id. at 316; see also LINN HAMMERGREN,
ENVISIONING REFORM 213-40 (2007) [hereinafter HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING
REFORM] (arguing that judicial reform efforts must learn other experiences and failures
rather than continuing "to design and execute projects in a near informational vacuum"
in order to fix many of the problems with reform efforts).
43.
See Seidman & Seidman, supra note 40, at 3 ("[These authors] take as
given that, under the right conditions, legal change facilitates social and economic
change .... [Those] actively engaged in the legal aid enterprise, sub silentio ... reject
arguments [that legal change cannot affect social and economic change].").
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anthropology, and critical history.44 These critiques directly challenge
the self-understanding of law and development practitioners as
altruistically motivated humanitarians, and cast their presumed
cosmopolitanism as simply retreaded ethnocentrism. 45 Therefore, as
tightly as law and development has clung to its claims of contributing
to legal progress abroad, so too have critics in the legal imperialism
vein steadfastly claimed that such work paves the way for social
46
exploitation and global legal convergence.
The net consequence of charges of legal imperialism has been to
reinforce the move toward psychological or abstract ethical defenses
of the intentions of law and development work. 47 It has become a
necessary component of even the most strident internal critics to
highlight the good intentions of past and current foreign legal
reformers. 48 In the main, there is little direct evidence to question
such intentions-to the extent such is considered a relevant
defense. 4 9 More importantly, the sum of such recurrent claims of
imperialism or ethnocentrism has provoked far too much emphasis on

44.
See John Flood, Legal Education, Globalization, and the New Imperialism,
in THE LAW SCHOOL: GLOBAL ISSUES, LOCAL QUESTIONS 127, 127-50 (Fiona Cownie
ed., 1999) (arguing that law and development is a kind of "legal imperialism").
See PETER FITZPATRICK, MODERNISM AND THE GROUNDS OF LAW 212 (2001)
45.
(noting that the practice of universal human rights "is definitively situated in the West,
a 'West' which is the occidental orientation of the community of nations. That situation
will now be underlined when human rights are located in that 'economic law' which
sustains globalism as the new imperialism."); Peter Fitzpatrick, Law's Infamy, in LAW
AND CRISIS IN THE THIRD WORLD 27 (Sammy Adelman & Abdul Paliwala eds., 1993)
("Not only has law [denied being in law] to the peoples of the Third World, but that
very denial, I argue, is integral to the constitution of Western law itself. If this is so, it
follows that the blithe advocacy of law in the cause of development is flawed in its very
foundation.").
46.
The predictions of these critics have not materialized. The logic of
exploitation and convergence is undermined by the very same record of law and
development's inefficacy. In contrast, the strong predictions of global legal convergence
along Americans forms have instead yielded to more complicated debates on national
differentiation. See generally FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM (Terence C. Halliday
et al. eds., 2007) (presenting several case studies from different countries to suggest
that the legal profession has a universally strong role in moving toward political
liberalism); KATHARINA PISTOR & PHILIP A. WELLONS, THE ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS IN ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1999) (comparing the level of
convergence between different Asian countries' patterns of legal and economic change
to determine how law matters for economic development in Asia).
47.
William P. Alford, Exporting the "Pursuitof Happiness," 113 HARV. L. REV.
1677, 1681 (2000) (noting the resistance to the critical analysis of intentions, where
instead critiques are supposed to be moderate "lest we appear to be dismissive of the
worthiness of the objective in question, doubtful of the sincerity of its proponents, or
indifferent to the fate of the would-be beneficiaries").
48.
See, e.g., Krishnan, supra note 16.
49.
See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4
WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1088 (1974) ("Liberal legalism was not a cynical sham... [i]t was
the sincere expression of the American legal elite's view of itself."); see also Krishnan,
supra note 16.
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dismissing other more critical claims through the same psychological
language of optimism and the looming specter of inaction in the face
50
of humanitarian needs.
In the end, both the internal and external critiques of law and
development have created an essentially emotional and aspirational
set of defenses that are difficult to fully rebut in empirical terms.
Even though law and development work consistently violates the
basic challenges of comparative law, it is hard to definitely say that
some alchemy of nuance, reflection, humility, and self-critique will
not transcend past errors.
C. The PersistentCycles of Contemporary Law and Development
The fact that law and development so strongly shapes American
lawyers' attitudes about and engagements with foreign legal systems,
coupled with the longitudinal and expansive investments of time and
material resources in such efforts, prompts many questions. At what
point does optimism descend into self-delusion? At what threshold do
we accept that law and development is intractably at odds with
genuine comparative law? And when does the paradox of law and
development become recognized as pathological rather than
redeemable? The best empirical basis on which to advance the
argument that the flaws of law and development are intractable and
pathological is then historical. If a sense of progressive learning
undergirds the optimism that sustains the field, then one can only
counter by exposing the historic breadth and depth of the field's lack
of success. To this end, we turn to a demonstration of how law and
development has already gone through several geographic and
theoretical cycles of critique and optimistic renewal that show little, if
any, evidence of transcending its rejection of the core tenets of
comparative law.
Traditional accounts of law and development characterize the
"first wave" of such efforts as beginning with the American movement
to promote reform among Latin American judiciaries and law schools
during the 1960s. The most well-known evaluation of this effort was
made by David Trubek and Marc Galanter, who cataloged the
"malaise" of this generation in light of the movement's generally
recognized failure. 5 1 Strikingly, Trubek and Galanter's evaluation
contains almost all of the self-critiques cited by contemporary law and

50.
See R. James Orr, In Review: New Publications on International and
Comparative Law, 2 INT'L JUD. MONITOR 117 (2007) (reviewing STROMSETH, supra note
28) ("[Tlrue optimism requires only an underlying and deeply held belief that good can
come from any situation....").
51.
Trubek & Galanter, supranote 49, at 1064.
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development scholars. 52 Thus, the thrust of their explanation of the
failure to export the first wave's model of "legal liberalism" was that
participants proceeded from a misleading faith in the cultural
neutrality of their legal reform agenda, that they were preoccupied by
the transfer of formal models, and presented an idealized version of
American legal institutions bereft of domestic variations or
53
criticisms.
Trubek and Galanter's evaluation of the "first wave" was echoed
by a range of other participants. Thomas Franck wrote about the
failures of the "New Development" approach and forwarded a similar
catalog of "lessons learned."'54 Others emphasized the lack of
empirical validation of connections between legal reform and social
development. 55 The governmental agency reports generated during
this era also replicated, to various degrees, the now popular criticism
of "blueprints" and other universal models that invariably deaden an
emphasis on local knowledge or variation. 56 What did differentiate
this "first wave" was that many of its participants were trained
comparativists who, in much higher rates than is common today,
subsequently gave up law and development work in total-which
inspired some of them to reinvigorate their commitment to refining
contextual aspects of their own comparative scholarship. 5 7 As would

52.
Compare Trubek & Galanter, supra note 49 (opposing law and development
minded reforms), with BERGLING, supra note 41 (espousing law and development
minded reforms), and TREBILCOCK & DANIELS, supra note 20 (same).
53.
Trubek & Galanter, supranote 49, at 1094.
54.
See Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and
Legal Institutions Help Developing Countries?, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 767; see also INT'L
LEGAL CTR., LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 45-69 (1974) (naming multiple problems revealed
by their survey of law and development social and policy research); Robert Seidman,
Law and Development: A General Model, 6 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 311, 325-37 (1971)
(creating a heuristic model to examine several hypothesized problems in law and
development in Africa).
55.
See, e.g., John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On
the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J.
COMP. L. 457, 461 (1977) ("[T]he notion that society is somehow moving toward a better
state of earthly affairs or, in the alternative, that the possibility of continuous
improvement in the social condition is there if we only think clearly and manage things
properly ... is a belief-a faith ultimately not subject to empirical verification.").
56.
ROBERT MEAGHER & DAVID SMITH, LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT
PRACTITIONER 13 (1974) ("[T]he state of the art(s) requires a country-by-country
approach and the gathering of empirical data around less refined hypotheses,
eventually providing the basis for a general theory of law and development.").
57.
See Lawrence M. Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 29, 30-31 (1969) (suggesting that difficult cross-cultural work is needed
in the disciplines of history, political science, economics, and socialology in order to
develop a comprehensive law and development theory); Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor
Kingfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation, and the
Development of Legal Education in India, 4 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 472 (2004)
(detailing the Ford Foundation's difficulties in developing a western legal education
system in India and subsequent decision to discontinue this focus in favor of
agricultural reform); Merryman, supra note 55, at 460 (analyzing the reasons for the
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also be the case in future decades, a small number of former
practitioners would publicly issue calls to abandon such work as
58
inherently flawed.
In his 1977 summary of this post-first-wave scholarship, Elliot
Burg noted that just a decade later that while issues had "been
persistently raised with respect to the efficacy" of such projects,

practitioners and scholars had already demonstrated a tendency to
repeat these errors in continued efforts "to the extent of ignoring their

own findings. ' 59 Tellingly, Burg himself ended his summary analysis
with a call for optimism

internalized.

60

that

such lessons would

inevitably be

The trajectory of law and development after this first wave
followed a similar pattern of criticism and renewed enthusiasm as

American legal reformers moved from one new regional emphasis to
another. Recent scholarship has revealed earlier systemic efforts to
export American legal education in both India and Africa during and
beyond this "first-wave" era in Africa and India. 6 1 Notably, wherever
law and development turned its focus in the 1980s, similar
evaluations were produced that both admitted poor results, but then
reasserted the base desirability of such efforts and their improvement
in the not-too-distant future.

62

This cycle of critique and optimistic renewal moved beyond the
traditional "developing" world during the 1990s, when the fall of the
Soviet Union helped usher in

a revitalized interest in the catalytic

potential of transplanting American legal institutions into the former

decline in funding, foundation activity, and scholarly work in law and development by
looking at the origins and style of the law and development movement).
58.
See, e.g., TERESA HAYTER, AID AS IMPERIALISM (1971) (explaining the
critique written by Hayter, an ex-ODI worker, around whom there was a scandal
concerning claims that her evaluation was suppressed as it negatively evaluated World
Bank policies).
59.
Elliot Burg, Law and Development: A Review of the Literature & a Critique
of "Scholarsin Self-Estrangement," 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 492, 523 (1977).
60.
Id. at 530.
61.
See Krishnan, supra note 16 (describing efforts in India and Africa).
62.
Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and
Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167, 173-84 (1997) (stating that law
and development efforts in Africa during the 1980s, when "liberal legalism" dominated,
generated similarly poor results); see, e.g., James C. N. Paul, American Law Teachers
and Africa: Some Historical Observations, 31 J. AFR.L. 18 (1987) (showing knowledge
of the previous generation, but unapologetic about the potential to do better); Bruce
Zagaris, Law and Development or Comparative Law and Social Change-The
Application of Old Concepts in the Commonwealth Carribean,19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 591 (1988) (same); see also HARRY BLAIR & GARY HANSEN, WEIGHING THE
SCALES OF JUSTICE: STRATEGIC APPROACHES FOR DONOR-SUPPORTED RULE OF LAW
PROGRAMS (1994) (detailing "lessons learned" identical to those discussed during the
prior two decades); LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (J. Omotola & A. Adeogun eds.,1987)
(compiling articles with the focus of "address[ing] major legal issues within the context
of social economic and governmental policies with a view to charting new courses for
the future development of our legal system").
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Soviet Bloc.6 3 Once again, summary evaluations of this new wave
were less than sanguine, and from the outset they repeated the same
64
catalog of flawed assumptions and disappointing results.
Predictably, these results continue to be replicated today, less so in
65
Russia but with greater focus on Central Asia and the Balkans.
From the 1970s until today, perhaps the most consistent object of
American law and development work has been China. In the mid1970s, China began to welcome American lawyers within its borders
as it sought to increase its economic dynamism. 66 Quickly, law and
development became the cornerstone of Sino-American relations in
law. 67 Yet, here again in every subsequent decade, reports are
produced that lament the inefficacy of such efforts in shaping Chinese
legal reforms, and these reports recycle the historical package of law
and development criticisms. 68 Even the temporary disillusionment
after the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989 was short-lived, 69 and such

63.
See JANINE R. WEDEL, COLLISION AND COLLUSION 1 (2001) (noting the
interest of western countries in bringing democratic and economic reforms to the
former communist East Bloc); Jeffrey Kahn, The Search for the Rule of Law in Russia,
37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 353 (2005).
64.
See generally WEDEL, supra note 63, at 2-13 (2001) (describing a "gigantic
disconnect between East and West").
65.
See, e.g., Malcolm Russell-Einhor et al., Strengthening Access to
Information and Public Participationin Transition Countries-Latviaas a Case Study
in Administrative Law Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 459 (2002).
66.
See Ellen R. Elisaoph & Susan Grueneberg, Law on Display in China, 88
CHINA Q. 669 (1981); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, American BarAssociation Delegation Visits
the People's Republic of China, 64 A.B.A. J. 1516 (1978).
67.
Jamie P. Horsley, Doing Business with the People's Republic of China: The
Role of Foreign Lawyers, 7 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 63, 78 (1985) (noting much
excitement about the new vision of "foreign lawyers as educators"). See generally
Funding the Rule of Law, supra note 7 (including charts detailing the myriad of actors
involved).
68.
See Jacque DeLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance,
American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond,
20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 179 (1999) (detailing lack of knowledge about China by
international participants, the use of detailed prescriptions without local context, and
the predominance of short term projects); Sophia Woodman, Bilateral Aid to Improve
Human Rights, 51 CHINA PERSP. 28 (2004) (describing reform efforts that have proven
difficult to assess, possess limited transparency, discriminate against non-English
speaking partners, evidence a large urban bias, and are plagued by practitioner and
donor exaggeration of results).
69.
See Robert C. Berring, Farewell to All That, 19 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 431, 435-36 (1997) (arguing the existing common law legal system in Hong Kong
and any other Western legal system would not last upon Hong Kong's return to China);
Anthony Dicks, The Chinese Legal System: Reforms in the Balance, 119 CHINA Q. 540,
576 (1989) ("[T]he effects of the events of May/June 1989 on the legal system, even
when not very obvious, will be pervasive and harmful. Even if the rate of growth in
numbers of legal officials is maintained, as long as an atmosphere of repression
persists it will be difficult to regard China's legal institutions in a very optimistic
light.").
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work spread to Mongolia. 70 Some recent evaluations even continue to
directly cite the idea of a "learning curve," 7 1 while in tandem a
'72
reactive discourse develops against those who "forecast doom.
Again, even the harshest critics of law and development in China end
their critiques with assumptions of optimism and inexorable
progress,7 3 and the faith that such reform will undermine China's
74
authoritarian politics.
As these past cycles would predict, as reports emerge about law
and development efforts in the context of Middle Eastern nation
75
building, this cycle is again repeating itself along similar lines.
Throughout these shifts in time and geography, there is little
evidence that, contrary to the aspirations of past evaluations, any
new wave of law and development has been able to leave in its wake a
better empirical track record or produce a self-critique that does more
than simply ignore or repackage what was already observed during
the previous decades. 76 Certainly, there is a great degree of rhetorical

70.
See Brent White, Rotten to the Core: Project Capture and the Failure of
Judicial Reform in Mongolia, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 209 (2009) (discussing the failed
attempts at judicial reform). But see Sebastian R. Astrada, Exporting the Rule of Law
to Mongolia: Post-Socialist Legal and Judicial Reforms, 38 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POLY
461 (2010) (discussing the reform in Mongolia in a far more optimistic light).
71.
Note, Adopting and Adapting: Clinical Legal Education and Access to
Justice in China, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2134, 2155 & n.134 (2007) (citing Leah Wortham,
Aiding Clinical Education Abroad: What Can Be Gained and the Learning Curve on
How to Do So Effectively, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 615 (2006)).
72.
See Pierre Landry, The InstitutionalDiffusion of Courts in China: Evidence
from Survey Data, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN
REGIMES 207, 234 (Thomas Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008) (claiming optimism
after detailing the rare but satisfied users of courts, whose successes are largely
dependent on social connections).
73.
Randall Peerenboom, What Have We LearnedAbout Law and Development?
Describing,Predicting,and Assessing Legal Reforms in China, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 823
(2005); see Arwen Joyce & Tracye Winfrey, Taming the Red Dragon: A Realistic
Assessment of the ABA's Legal Reform Efforts in China, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 887,
900-02 (2004) (expressing optimism in ABA-Asia's programs potential to contribute to
positive reforms in China after explaining the unlikelihood of success of reforms in
China).
74.
Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems
and Prospectsof U.S.-Sponsored 'Rule of Law' Reform Projects in the People's Republic
of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 74-75 (2000). Contra Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 603, 621 (2002) ("To achieve
true legal reform, even to approximate a minimum conception of the rule of law, and to
build a public culture that values and supports it, is truly a vast task.").
75.
See, e.g., Faiz Ahmed, Shari'a, Custom, and Statutory Law: Comparing
State Approaches to Islamic Jurisprudence, Tribal Autonomy, and Legal Development
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 7 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 47-49 (2007). See generally THE
RULE OF LAW IN AFGHANISTAN: MISSING IN INACTION (Whit Mason ed., 2011).
76.
Carothers is often cited by a range of practitioners, who then restate his
conclusions as their own insights or who simply continue to use the same criticized
mindset. See Elizabeth Barad, Export and Import of the Rule of Law in the Global Era,
11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 323 (2005) (discussing lessons learned by the author
through her experiences with exporting U.S. laws and legal ethics abroad); Sean
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recognition of past pitfalls and the development of new verbiage to
describe the export process, 77 but in the end such rhetorical shifts
have not changed the outcome or operation of law and development
efforts. 78 Even the few scholars who come to question the general
validity of law and development are soon passed over 7 9 -to

the extent

that the most recent compilation of law and developments errors by
Brian Tamanaha ends with a preemptively fatalistic lament that his

own analysis is likely to have no effect on the field.80

Hagan, The IMF's Role in a Post-Conflict Situation, 38 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 59
(2006) (citing Thomas Carothers, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of
Knowledge 8 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 34, 2003)); John
Reitz, Export of the Rule of Law, 13 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (2003)
(citing THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD: THE LEARNING CURVE
(1999)). For transcriptions of two recent conferences recycling these critiques, see
Katharina Pistor, Advancing the Rule of Law: Report on the InternationalRule of Law
Symposium Convened by the American Bar Association November 9-10, 2005, 25
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 7 (2007) (reporting on the ABA's first International Rule of Law
Symposium, held in Washington, DC) and CTR. ON DEMOCRACY, DEV. & THE RULE OF
LAW [CDDRL], REORGANIZING U.S. GOVERNMENT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION EFFORTS
(2008) (summarizing key findings from Stanford University's CDDRL conference in
2008).
77.
What is novel beyond the "first wave" are new tropes of displaced
responsibility. Here, blame for the failure of efforts-self-criticism aside-is placed on
the countries to which American law is meant to be exported, commonly articulated in
either terms of cultural incommensurability or a lack of "will to reform." See, e.g., Brian
Gill, Aiding the Rule of Law Abroad: The Kyrgyz Republic as a Case Study, 29
FLETCHER FIN. WORLD AFF. 133, 151 (2005) (analyzing a decade of rule of law
promotion in the Kyrgyz Republic, and concluding that decades of efforts must be
expended to "prepare the soil of society for lasting democracy"). Contra Matthew
Spence, The Complexity of Success: The U.S. Role in Russian Rule of Law Reform, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 26, at 241 (asserting that criminal
justice reform in Russia represents "a rare success story of rule of law promotion").
78.
See Julio Faundez, Legal Technical Assistance, Introduction to GOOD
GOVERNMENT AND LAW 1 (Julio Faundez ed., 1997) (arguing that although the phrase
"legal technical assistance" has become popular to describe aid provided to developing
countries, it is actually "little more than a new phrase to describe an old practice");
Kathryn Hendley, The Rule of Law and Economic Development in a Global Era, in THE
BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 605, 617 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004)
(arguing that the call for "careful research ...seems compelling. Yet time and time
again, this simple prescription is ignored."); Patrick McAuslan, Law, Governance and
the Development of the Market: Practical Problems and Possible Solutions, in GOOD
GOVERNMENT AND LAW, supra, at 44.
79.
Kevin Davis, Legal Universalism: PersistentObjections, 60 U. TORONTO L.J.
537, 538 (2010) ("[A]ll claims that any specific feature of the legal system invariably
has a causal and positive relationship to development are inherently suspect.").
80.
See Carol V. Rose, The "New" Law and Development Movement in the PostCold War Era: A Vietnam Case Study, 32 LAw & Soc'y REV. 93, 135 (1998) ("Given the
problems inherent in legal transfer, the question for scholars and academics involved
in the [New Law and Development Movement] will be not merely how to conduct legal
exchange but, indeed, whether to do so."). See generally Jane Rueger, From Reluctant
Champion to Development Ringmaster: Managing the Expanding Mission of the World
Bank, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 201 (2003) (examining the World Bank's
expanding role, including assistance in establishing legal institutions, in light of the
experiences of the British East India Company).
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Parallel to this problematic recycling of "lessons learned" is a
similar stagnation in law and development's theoretical debates.
Looking back to the work of the "first wave," Yves Dezalay and
Bryant Garth summarily lament that the implications of the first law
and development movement did not lead to innovations in legal
scholarship.8 ' General advances in comparative legal theory
generally remain isolated from law and development work, 8 2 and
whatever outside impact has been present is almost exclusively made
by new modes of economic analysis that have only exacerbated the
8 3
traditional problems of apoliticism, formalism, and idealization.
Nowhere has this pattern been clearer than in the assumptions
made about the link between legal reform and economic
development.8 4 Empirical studies based on past development
experiences have repeatedly undermined the assumption that both
general and specific legal institutions are universally linked to
economic development. 8 5 Yet, new scholarship continually emerges

Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, Law, Lawyers and Social Capital, 6 SOC. &
81.
LEGAL STUD. 109, 120 (1997).
82.
See Thomas McInerney, Law and Development as Democratic Practice, 1
VOICES OF DEV. JURISTS 1, no. 1, 2004, at 1 ("[R]ule of law promotion activities must
respect the internal relation between law and democracy in order to bring about the
conditions under which legitimate legal orders can emerge."); Jonathan Miller, A
Typology of Legal Transplants,51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003) (offering "a first attempt
to understand the legal transplant process through the tool of a sociological typology");
Gordon Barron, The World Bank and Rule of Law Reforms (Dev. Studies Inst., Working
Paper No. 1, 2005) ("The primary argument of this paper is that the [rule of law] is a
social and political idea more than anything else.").
See Kalin Ivanov, The Limits of a Global Campaign Against Corruption,in
83.
CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT 28 (Sarah Bracking ed., 2007) (examining the World
Bank's and the IMF's global fights against corruption and suggesting that such fights
have little hope of success unless narrowly tailored to individual situations); Chantal
Thomas, Law and NeoclassicalEconomic Development in Theory and Practice: Toward
an InstitutionalistCritique of Institutionalism, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2011) (noting
that such "learning processes" are bounded by theoretical assumptions and have deep
causality problems). See generally Amanda J. Perry, The Relationship Between Legal
Systems and Economic Development: Integrating Economic and Cultural Approaches,
29 J.L. & Soc'y 282 (2002) ("[Tlhere is a clear need for a more interdisciplinary
approach to the debate over the relationship between legal reform and economic
development, and the potential variance in private sector perceptions and expectations
of legal systems in particular."); Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: Their
Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U.
TORONTO L.J. 853 (2005) (reflecting on "functionalist and formalist reasoning about
legal rights and the rule of law in contemporary debates on law and development and
in the international financial institutions in particular").
84.
Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Scapegoat and Magic Charm: Law in
Development Theory and Practice, in AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF
DEVELOPMENT 116 (Mark Hobart ed., 1993).
ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES (Peter Murrell
85.
ed., 2001); Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2008); John K. M.
Ohnesorge, Developing Development Theory: Law and Development Orthodoxies and
the NortheastAsian Experience, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 219 (2007).
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that tries to remodulate research designs and reassert the argument
that such a relationship exists, both for law in general8 6 and for
judicial reform specifically.8 7 This scholarship puts its faith in new
data or new methodological refinements that will finally demonstrate
the connection, the recalcitrant reassertion of which comes across as
almost an immutable cognitive imperative.88 In turn, a small set of
critical scholars emerge to challenge such work, casting such linkages
into doubt, and inspiring the next round of reassertions.8 9 Much of
this work obsesses over China's consistent defiance of these
theoretical presuppositions. 90
This unyielding desire to prove the normative desirability of
transplanting forms of American law abroad is repeated both in the
broad terms of political development-primarily couched as
democratization 9 1-and
in more narrow assertions about what
constitutes legal progress-such as legal formalization, 92 stronger
94
property rights, 93 or stricter intellectual property regimes.

86.
See, e.g., KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW-GROWTH NEXUS (2006) (asserting
that legal institutions are, in fact, important to economic development).
87.
JAMES ANDERSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
(2005); Hilton L. Root & Karen May, Judicial Systems and Economic Development, in
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, supra note 72, at
324.
88.
See Jessica T. Matthews, Foreword to CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at vii
(asserting that people often have an "instinctive sense" that law and development work
is a "good thing").
89.
John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the
Developmental States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND
SOUTHEAST ASIA 91, 107 (Christoph Antons ed., 2003).
90.
See Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis:
The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003); Katherine Wilhelm, Rethinking
Property Rights in Urban China, 9 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 227 (2004).
91.
See generally Matteo Cervellati et al., Consensual and Conflictual
Democratization, Rule of Law and Development (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 6328, 2007) (examining efforts at democratization and rule of law
development); Adam Przeworski & Fernando Limongi, Modernization: Theories and
Facts, 49 WORLD POL. 155, 158 (1997) ("The specific causal chains consist of sequences
of industrialization, urbanization, education, communication, mobilization, and
political incorporation, among innumerable others: a progressive accumulation of social
changes that ready a society to proceed to its culmination, democratization.").
92.
Stephan Haggard et al., The Rule of Law and Economic Development, 11
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 205 (2008); Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law
Orthodoxy (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Working Paper No. 30, 2002); cf.
LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW 150 (2002) (noting the drive for formality is ironic
given that American informal dispute resolution is often characterized as more
"civilized" in legal discourse).
93.
See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000). But see Ulrike
Malmendier, Law and Finance "at the Origin," 47 J. ECON. LIT. 1076 (2009) (arguing,
by drawing parallel to ancient Rome, that the lack of legal progress may not inhibit
economic growth as much as once thought).
94.
Chibundu, supra note 62, at 207; Robert L. Ostergard, Economic Growth
and Intellectual Property Rights Protection: A Reassessment of the Conventional
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For all these cycles of lessons learned and theoretical
reassertions, the popularity of law and development has suffered
little diminution in both material and intellectual terms. Even those
aware of the repetition of past errors and the consistent lack of
effects reassert the unassailable
empirically demonstrable
desirability of continued optimism and renewed effort.9 5 The weight
of this cyclical history, restated and repackaged by new critics every
few years, has been insufficient to secure a broad recognition that the
flaws of law and development remain, intractably and irredeemably,
at odds with the traditions of comparative law.

III.

THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AS
ANTI- COMPARATIVE LAW

Over the past fifty years, the continued and open paradox of law
and development has been insufficient to hasten its demise. The
generalized optimism into which its proponents retreat has been
successful in justifying this record of failure. This Part argues that
the historical burden that should be weighed against such optimism
is much greater than is generally recognized today. Rather than
beginning with the "first wave" associated with Trubek and Galanter
in the 1960s, American law and development ideas and practices
have been at work for over 100 years. This Part outlines this deeper
history of law and development, and how foreign legal reform in the
early twentieth century was intimately tied not only to the formative
movements that forged the modern self-image of the American legal
community, but also to the decline of American comparative law. The
Part concludes by showing how this history helps us better
understand law and development's contemporary paradox as an
outgrowth of cultural politics embedded in American law during this
era, rather than as a field of legal knowledge production or applied
legal action.

Wisdom, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 115 (Daniel Gervais
ed., 2007).
David Trubek has made a lifetime contribution to law and development
95.
work, often bitingly critical but yet ever hopeful. After over four decades of work in the
field, he feels that past lessons have created an endeavor that is "daunting but also
more exciting." David Trubek, The "Rule of Law" in Development Assistance, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 37; see also David Trubek,

The Owl and the Pussy-cat: Is There a Future for "Law and Development"?, 25 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 235 (2007).
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A. The Early Twentieth Century Birth of Law and Development
At the turn of the twentieth century, American lawyers were at
the center of vibrant arguments over the proper shape of America's
increasingly prominent role in international relations. In the
aftermath of the Spanish-American War and the acquisition of
96
foreign territories outside of America's continental bounds,
American lawyers fiercely debated whether the American republican
tradition was compatible with forms of European colonial empire
from which many had long tried to distance the country. 97 These
debates were resolved doctrinally in the Insular Cases, where in a
series of hotly contested decisions the Supreme Court legitimized the
acquisition of colonial territories. 98 In fact, one of the most oftforgotten aspects of this era was how strong the support for American
colonialism was among American lawyers. 99
However, colonial empire was not the path taken after the
Spanish-American War. Instead, American foreign policy came to
embrace other forms of indirect and consensual engagement with

96.
See generally ARTHUR POWER DUDDEN, THE AMERICAN PACIFIC (1992);
PAUL A. KRAMER, THE BLOOD OF GOVERNMENT (2006); ALFRED W. MCCOY, POLICING
AMERICA'S EMPIRE (2009); SALLY MERRY, COLONIZING HAWAII (1999); EFREN RIVERA
RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY (2001); EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER
AMERICAN COLONIES (2006).
AMY KAPLAN, THE ANARCHY OF EMPIRE IN THE MAKING OF US CULTURE 7
97.

(2005); Roger J. Bresnahan, Islands in Our Minds, in REFLECTION ON ORIENTALISM 57
(Warren Cohen ed., 1983). See generally EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: RHETORIC VS.
REALITY (Abraham Lowenthal ed., 1991). For the formal policy against colonial
language in the Philippines, see YVES DEZELAY & BRYANT GARTH, ASIAN LEGAL
REVIVALS: LAWYERS IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE 76-89 (2010) and STANLEY KARNOW, IN
OUR IMAGE (1989).
98.
Most of these new territories had various "Organic Acts" which provided a
constitutional infrastructure. Citizens in these territories resurrected old constitutional
questions about the rights of foreign citizens under American jurisdiction abroad. See
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (upholding the jurisdiction of a military tribunal that
sentenced a foreign-born mariner to death for a murder committed on board an
American ship at port in Japan). See generallyJAMES KERR, THE INSULAR CASES (1982)
(providing a detailed examination of the Insular Cases, including popular sentiment of
the time that might help explain the result); BARTHOLOMEW SPARROW, THE INSULAR
CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (chronicling the Insular
Cases and seeking to place them in their larger historical context).
99.
See, e.g., Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the
Acquisition and Government by the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV.
393 (1894); John Burgess, How May the US Govern Its Extra-ContinentalTerritory?, 14
POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1899); Christopher C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12
HARV. L. REV. 365 (1898); Carman Randolph, ConstitutionalAspects of Annexation, 12
HARV. L. REV. 291 (1898); James Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARv. L. REV. 464
(1898).
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foreign legal systems. 10 0 Primarily drawing on the foreign expertise of
religious missionaries, the American government and a swath of
private
organizations,
including
philanthropic
foundations,
professional societies, and universities began to fund efforts to shape
foreign legal reform. 10 ' These efforts are easily recognizable today as
the forerunners to contemporary law and development projects, and
included the writing of constitutions, the export of American legal
education, and the organization of foreign bar associations.1 0 2 From
the outset, such work was meant to intentionally differentiate the
American lawyer abroad from his colonial European counterparts,
especially the British. 0 3 Historian Paul Carrington has cataloged
many of these early efforts, capturing how legal reform projects
became tied to the growing presence of American lawyers across the
globe. 10 4 Furthermore, this era witnessed the near domination of
American foreign policy by lawyers who, while often divided on issues
of international law, shared a common belief in the role of American
05
lawyers as foreign reformers.'
The rapid proliferation of American engagements with foreign
legal reform at this time was intrinsically tied to the idea that law
was best understood as a scientific enterprise. Often linked to the
popularity of theories of legal evolution, 0 6 many American lawyers
expressed great confidence that law could not only be used
instrumentally to effect social change at home-part and parcel of
Progressive-era politics-but "that the universality of legal science
could achieve the same ends abroad. '10 7 These new instrumentalist
views of law used the presumption of scientific validity to argue that

100.
See LLOYD E. AMBROSIUS, WOODROW WILSON & THE AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC
TRADITION (1987) (describing the Wilsonian shift in American foreign policy emerging
out of the expansionist debates).
101.
See infra Part III.B.
102.
See infra Part III.B.
103.
Legal reform was an original British justification for colonialism. See
generally MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER (1985); NICHOLAS B.
DIRKS, THE SCANDAL OF EMPIRE (2006); HANS S. PAWLISCH, SIR JOHN DAVIES AND THE
CONQUEST OF IRELAND (1985); BERNARD PORTER, EMPIRE AND SUPEREMPIRE (2006).
104.
PAUL CARRINGTON, SPREADING AMERICA'S WORD, at ix (2005) (explaining
that the book is "about the role of American lawyers in international politics as they
have striven to make the governments and laws of other peoples more like their own").
105.
Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From
the Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 (2003); Jonathan Zasloff, Law
and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: The Twenty Years' Crisis, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 583 (2004).
106.
See Steven Wilf, The Invention of Legal Primitivism, 10 THEORETICAL INQ.
L. 485 (2009) (examining the origins and evolution of the theory of legal modernism);
cf. e.g., BROOKS ADAMS, THE LAW OF CILIZATION AND DECAY (1896) (presenting one
such theory); LEWIS HENRY MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY (1877) (examining the
evolution of peoples and their institutions throughout history).
107.
Jedidiah Kroncke, An Early Tragedy of Comparative Constitutionalism:
Frank Goodnow & the Chinese Republic, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. (forthcoming 2012).
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legal development was best considered the provenance of legal
expertise than of political deliberation and process.1 08
The notion of law as legal science had profound effects on
American law and transformed the American legal profession at the
turn of the twentieth century-a process that forms the substance of
the classic works in modern legal history. 0 9 Scientific notions of law
had great appeal to the American legal elite who had long battled
more populist views of the profession emergent during the Jacksonian
era. 110 This was felt directly in American legal education, where the
notion of legal science championed by Christopher Langdell had farreaching effects on the creation of America's modern form of
postgraduate legal education 1" and the concurrent movement away
1 12
from more localized traditions of apprenticeship.
New notions of legal expertise were also central to the shifting
professional identity of lawyers, and in turn, central to the growth of
bar associations, 113 as well as the growth of urban corporate legal
practice.' 14 The sum force of these shifts was the emergence of a new
notion of the "American lawyer" and the underpinning legal
institutions that produced him. 115 Notably, this new professionalized

108.
See ROBERT WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 1 (1967)
(describing the "new scientific gospel"); see also LISA ANDERSON, PURSUING TRUTH,
EXERCISING POWER (2003); Eliza Wing-yee Lee, Political Science, Public
Administration, and the Rise of the American Administrative State, 55 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 538 (1995).
109.
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW, 1870-1960 (1992); WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950).
110.
MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY:
1776-1876, at 137 (1976).
111.
Christopher C. Langdell, Teaching Law as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 125
(1887); see also Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning
of Anti-Formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1 (1980). See generally
WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION
(1994) (tracing the development of modern legal education); Howard Schweber, The
"Science" of Legal Science: The Model of Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century
American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421 (1999).
112.
RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 43-44 (1989); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 526 (2005).
113.
Harry Frist, Competition in the Legal Education Industry, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 311 (1978); Edward Gee & Donald Jackson, Hand in Hand or Fist in Glove?: A
History of the StrainedMarriageof Law Schools and the PracticingBar, 3 LEARNING &
L. 34, 55-56 (1976); Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 36
(1983).
114.
See generally Clarke, supra note 90 (using post-Mao China to test the
Rights Hypothesis-that "productive capitalism needs formal adjudication, judicially
enforced contracts, and inviolable property rights"); Wilhelm, supra note 90 (explaining
the "the weak protection for urban property rights and the serious consequences this
holds for China's economic development and social stability" that stem from China's
policy of chai qian, or "demolition and relocation").
115.
The American commitment to federalism embraces a legal diversity that
goes beyond even Weber's classic lament as to the common law's administrative
complexity and doctrinal ambiguities. For a broad revisionist overview of the place of
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image of the American lawyer was seen as crucial to progressively
integrating both the post-Civil War southern and western states into
national
especially
through
the
northeastern
civilization,
standardization of American legal education along the Langdellian
postgraduate model. 116 This era also witnessed a significant rise in
the status of the federal judiciary-following the growing power of the
federal government and the nationalization of vast areas of American
law-which in turn became closely associated with the new
117
professional law schools.
Even though many of these developments in American law were
hotly contested at the time, 118 the allure of law as an apolitical
exertion of expertise eventually consumed the profession. 119
Critically, these shifts provided the organizational and conceptual
basis for private lawyers to participate in foreign reform projects and
created the modern law professor as a full-time legal researcher and
20
producer of legal knowledge.'
When wedded to a notion of legal science, these novel and newly
dominant elements of the American legal community formed what

federalism in American law, see ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2010). The mid-nineteenth century case of Swift v. Tyson
ignited a movement toward the development of a unified federal common law, but
resistance to the broad application of Swift's reasoning would eventually reassert the
primacy of federalist norms in American law. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). The end of the Swift
doctrine came with Brandeis's repudiation of federal common law in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
116.
Alfred S. Konefsky, Law and Culture in Antebellum Boston, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 1119, 1134 (1988); see also Alfred Konefsky & John Schlegel, Mirror, Mirror on
the Wall: Histories of American Law Schools, 95 HARV. L. REV. 833 (1982) (offering a
critique of the decline of the free market in law schools and increasing standardization,
as well as presenting a critique of standard law school histories that mark the adoption
of the Langdellian model as an inevitable evolutionary progression).
117.
This triumph of the federal judiciary as a repository of legal integration
accelerated with the defeat of the South, casting a pall over states' rights. See William
Novak, The Legal Origins of the American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY
267 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002).
118.
WILLIAM JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF
PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 177 (1978) ("The battle over the case method in the years
between 1890-1920 was especially bitter because it represented a fundamental
struggle over the image of the professional lawyer.").
119.
MORTON HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at
256 (1977) ("The desire to separate law and politics has always been a central
aspiration of the American legal profession."); see also Robert Gordon, Critical Legal
Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 125 (1984) (asserting that Critical historians have
"added powerfully to the critique of the functionalist-evolutionary vision that has so
long dominated legal studies and that they have produced their own distinctive and
exciting brand of doctrinal historiography and successfully taught others how to apply
their method").
120.
Robert Gordon, Professor and Policymakers, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW
SCHOOL 79 (Anthony Kronman ed., 2004) (noting how the law professor became part of
a new cadre of professional academics who could collectively "monopolize their own
distinctive disciplinary turf.., which was law as an autonomous technical subject").
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today are the most popular aspects of law and development work:
spreading American legal education, organizing and strengthening
bar associations, promoting judicial reform, and laying the
groundwork for modern corporate legal practice. The specific rise of
each one of these aspects of twentieth century American law was a
contested development, and belied that there was, and still is, a great
deal of underlying diversity in American legal practice. 12 1 Yet, when
confronted abroad with the question of what was "American law" or
the prototypical "American lawyer," these components, along with the
American Constitution, would form the basis of the standard
response. 122 Whatever disagreements existed about American law
domestically, there was a particular arrangement of these new legal
institutions that was presumed necessary to replicate the modern
American lawyer abroad.
Although a full retelling of the foreign reform projects of this era
is beyond the scope of this Article, through the work of Carrington
and other legal historians, new scholarship has begun to explore the
extent of such work in the early to mid-twentieth century. 123 Notably,
these scholarly works all continue to recast the same failures and
124
"lessons learned" inherent in contemporary law and development.
B. America's First Wave of Law and Development Goes Global
A forgotten aspect of American legal internationalism of the
early twentieth century was that China was the highest profile arena
of foreign legal reform for American lawyers. When the dynastic
Chinese system collapsed in 1911 and the new Chinese Republic was
declared, a fertile field was seen as opening for the influence of
American lawyers and the demonstration of American law's ability to

121.
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (reversing the Court's
decision in Swift and holding that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction must
apply state common law as well as state statutory law); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1
(1842), rev'd, Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (holding that federal courts sitting in diversity
jurisdiction may apply federal common law); LACROIX, supra note 115 (tracing the
origins and evolution of federalism in America).
122.
See generally Paul D. Carrington, Writing Other Peoples' Constitutions, 33
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 167 (2008) (providing an account of "the efforts of
Americans who sought to shape other nations not by war, but by writing, or helping to
write, their constitutions," and arguing that the practice may be less useful than often
imagined).
123.
See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 81; see also MERLE CURTI & KENDALL
BIRR, PRELUDE TO POINT FOUR 92-93, 121, 130 (1954) (noting failed legal reform efforts
in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti).
124.
CARRINGTON, supra note 104, at ix ("[N]otwithstanding past failures and
disappointments, others have persisted in proclaiming again and again the same high
and selfless purpose of shaping alien cultures to American models .... [T]hose coming
later who did take notice of the past were often misled about what experience should
have been taught.").
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spur liberalization and economic development. 125 Once studied with
126
interest by Founding Fathers such as Jefferson and Franklin,
Chinese law was now deemed wholly insufficient and in need of the
forms and institutions of the modern American lawyer. 127 Even
though China was tangential to American economic and military
interests in 1911,128 America became fascinated by the prospect that
China was committed to emulating America. Many lawyers advanced
example of America's new
Sino-American relations as the best
129
humanitarian legal internationalism.
During this actual "first wave" of law and development,
American lawyers attempted to bring all aspects of the new standard
package of modern American law to China. Even before the 1911
revolution, future Harvard law professor Warren Seavey attempted to
bring Langdell's methods to China, 130 and later-staffed by American
legal academics and expatriate lawyers-Soochow Law School was
of
founded in Southern China in 1913 with the specific intention 131
replicating the new American model of legal education in total.
American lawyers were also quick to organize national and local bar
associations while establishing their own urban corporate
practices. 132 The ABA and other legal organizations sponsored trips

125.
Part of the treaty signed after the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the
twentieth century involved American support for Chinese legal reform. CAROLA
McGIFFERT, CHINA IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION 31 (2003).
126.
JOHN CLEAVES, THOMAS JEFFERSON'S VIEWS ON PUBLIC EDUCATION 340
(1890); Benjamin Franklin, From the Morals of Confucius, PENN. GAZETTE, Feb. 28,
1738, at 74. See generally A. OWEN ALDRIDGE, THE DRAGON AND THE EAGLE: THE
PRESENCE OF CHINA IN THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT (1993).
127.
See generally Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 10 MICH. L. REV. 179
(2002) (combating "the historic claim made by many Western observers that China
lacks an indigenous tradition of 'law').
128.
HUGH DEANE, GOOD DEEDS & GUNBOATS 38-39 (1990). For pre-twentieth
century relations, see William J. Donahue, The Caleb Cushing Mission, 16 MODERN
ASIAN STUD. 1 (1982) (examining Caleb Cushing's tenure as the American
Commissioner to China); Teemu Ruskola, Canton Is Not Boston: The Invention of
American Imperial Sovereignty, 57 AM. Q. 859, 864 (2005) ("China figured only
minimally in the early American diplomatic consciousness .... ").
129.
See JERRY ISRAEL, PROGRESSIVISM AND THE OPEN DOOR 123-24 (1971)
(discussing how the United States sought to have China adopt its legal and
governmental structure).
130.
See WARREN A. SEAVEY & DONALD B. KING, A HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
PROFESSOR 17 (2005) (discussing his arrival in China to teach).
131.
Alison Conner, Lawyers and the Legal Profession During the Republican
Era, in CIL LAW IN QING AND REPUBLICAN CHINA 215 (Karen Bernhardt & Philip
Huang eds., 1994).
132.
See FAR E. AM. BAR ASS'N [FEABA], PRESIDENT'S ANNUAL REPORT (1919);
FEABA, UNITED STATES COURT FOR CHINA DECENNIAL ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE 6, 19
(1916). See generally Alison E.W. Conner, Soochow Law School and the Shanghai Bar,
23 HONG KONG L.J. 395 (1993); Xiaoqun Xu, Between State and Society, Between
Professionalism and Politics: The Shanghai Bar Association in Republican China,
1912-1937, 1 TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHINA 1 (1998).
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to China on topics ranging from prison reform to judicial education.
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace funded evaluations
of legal reform in China and sponsored Columbia law professor Frank
Goodnow's travels to China with the expectation that he would write
the new Republic's constitution. 134 Even America's extraterritorial
courts became enmeshed in the great concern over American judges
the proper functioning of
and lawyers' ability to demonstrate
135
American law to Chinese audiences.
Yet almost immediately, these reform efforts recurrently proved
themselves ineffectual in China. In practice, not only was Chinese
legal development predominantly influenced by Japanese and then
German influences, but China's legal system also remained
subordinate to the party politics of what were often American-backed
authoritarian regimes. 136 Nonetheless, throughout this era, the lack
of any material impact on Chinese legal development or of any
politics did not dampen American
liberalizing effect on Chinese
137
efforts.
such
for
enthusiasm
As unproductive as this first wave of law and development was
in China and elsewhere, such failures did not stop like efforts from
migrating to wherever America's foreign gaze settled. The emergence
of America as a superpower after World War II accelerated these
efforts globally. In the post-World War II era, America's defeated
enemies lay in ruins in the heart of both Asia and Europe, and just as
China was deemed a fallen empire, so too now was Europe and
Japan. 138 The legal reform enterprises in Germany and Japan soon
became folklore in America, and especially so in the American legal
139
community.
In the case of the Japanese, it became commonplace to proclaim
that America had brought constitutionalism to Japan, or that

Frank Dikotter, Crime and Punishment in Early Republican China:
133.
Beijing's FirstModel Prison, 1912-1922, 21 LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 140, 160 (2000).
Noel Pugach, Embarrassed Monarchist: Frank J. Goodnow and
134.
Constitutional Development in China, 1913-1915, 42 PAC. HIST. REV. 499 (1973); see
also Kroncke, supra note 107.
135.
EILEEN P. SCULLY, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE FROM AFAR (2001); Teemu
Ruskola, Colonialism Without Colonies: On the ExtraterritorialJurisprudence of the
U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (2008).
136.
JAMES BRADY, JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN PEOPLE'S CHINA 138-39 (1982).
ISRAEL, supra note 129, at 202 ("[T]o fail [in China] was, however, to fail at
137.
home. Thus to admit faulty goals in the Far East was to confess them in the United
States as well.").
This was the transition Henry Luce made when he famously spoke of "The
138.
American Century" based on his view of Sino-American relations. See generally Philip
Beidler, China Magic: America's Great Reality Hiatus, 1948-73, 47 MICH. Q. REV. 150,
153 (2008) (noting the almost magical quality to the massive blotting-out of America's
decades of fascination with China's Americanization).
139.
See, e.g., TONY SMITH, AMERICA'S MISSION 146 (1994) (recounting the
American experience with legal reform in Germany and Japan).

508

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 45.477

140
Americans had completely rewritten the Japanese legal system.
These claims ignored the fact that the new Japanese Constitution
was enacted as an amendment to the Meiji Constitution, as well as
how deeply involved the Japanese were in the process of negotiation
and composition. 141 It is telling that as commonplace as this story of
America's legal reinvention of Japan has become, only recently have
studies unearthed the details of the process and brought greater
clarity as to how limited the direct export of American legal models
was. 142 Quite paradoxically, this myth persists, although only a few
short decades later Japanese law would be criticized as the antithesis
143
of American law, not its legal progeny.
The same myth emerged during German reconstruction.
Although the process of reforming the West German legal system
similarly involved American legal advisers, their participation could
hardly be characterized as reorienting the German legal tradition
toward American models. Not only was the reconstruction of West
Germany a highly contested negotiation with the other Allied Powers,
its legal system was ultimately shaped and interpreted by German
14 4
interests.
Furthermore, the deployment of American legal reformers in
other areas of Europe as part of the Marshall Plan was predicated on

140.
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 160 ("Americans rewrote the Japanese
Constitution after World War II, in a hurry but with some success .. "); see also, e.g.,
Bringing Democracy to Japan, CONST. RTS. FOUND., http://www.crf-usa.org/electioncentrallbringing-democracy-to-japan.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
141.
See generally LAWRENCE BEER & JOHN MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO
DEMOCRACY (2002) (highlighting the seeds of constitutional democracy already in place
when American-led legal reform began in the wake of World War II); KYOKO INOUE,
MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (1991) (presenting the first cross-cultural and
cross-linguistic examination of the bilateral negotiations surrounding what was to
become Japan's system of constitutional democracy and suggesting that due to cultural
misunderstanding, the Japanese and the Americans held differing opinions of the
meaning of the constitution even as they signed it).
142.
RANDE KOSTAL, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: THE UNITED STATES AND THE
LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION OF GERMANY AND JAPAN (Harvard Univ. Press, forthcoming
2012); John Haley, American Lawyers in Postwar Japan (unpublished manuscript in
progress) (on file with author).
See ERIC A. FELDMAN, THE RITUAL OF RIGHTS IN JAPAN 1 (2000)
143.
("[C]halleng[ing] the belief that the assertion of rights is fundamentally incompatible
with Japanese legal, political, and social norms."). Contra CARL F. GOODMAN, THE
RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN 3 (2003) ("Japan's legal history is fundamentally different from
The legal history of Japan is mostly
legal history in England and the United States ....
a 'borrowed' history with feudal Japan's notions of the functions and purpose of law
being fundamentally at odds with a 'Rule of Law' society.").
144.
See PATRICK THADDEUS JACKSON, CIVILIZING THE ENEMY (2006); Erich J.
Hahn, U.S. Policy on a West German Constitution, 1947-1949, in AMERICAN POLICY
AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WEST GERMANY, 1945-1955, at 21 (Jeffry Diefendorf et
al. eds., 1993).
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a faith in American expertise, but it also succumbed to the same
145
classic package of law and development critiques.
This is not to glibly suggest that Americans did not influence the
reform process in these countries. Rather, it is to note that the reform
processes were far from "Americanization" processes, nor were they
carried out with predictable developmental effects catalyzed
specifically by American legal expertise. 146 Nevertheless, both the
Japanese and German examples became crucial for strengthening
and deepening the doctrinal belief that American legal expertise was
147
deployable in any foreign reform context.
The myriad of developments that transformed American law at
the turn of the century thus melded with a new vision of American
internationalism that had at its core the presumption that there was
not only something fresh and vital in American law, but that these
developments could be and should be imparted to the rest of the
world. In the context of foreign legal reform, the existence of domestic
debates over such changes was glossed over. 148 Whatever disunity or
contention was present stateside, these changes were carried forth by
a general consensus that American law, in whatever form, had
149
undergone an evolutionary leap forward.
What is striking about the unearthing of this earlier origin of law
and development thinking is that it is co-extant with scholarship that
has described and emphasized the early twentieth century as the
great flowering of comparative law in America, when foreign legal
ideas had a wide-ranging impact on American law. 150 The

145.
HARRY BAYARD PRIcE, THE MARSHALL PLAN AND ITS MEANING 369 (1955)
("American experience, it soon appeared, was far less relevant than had been
supposed ....Any illusion that dollars and technical 'know-how' were endowed with
mystic qualities that could make economic deserts bloom like the rose was quickly
dispelled in the face of hard realities in Asia.").
146.
See, e.g., Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan's Legal and Judicial
System Under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B.J. 290 (1949) (detailing how
legal changes made in Japan after World War II involved numerous influences, not just
American influences); see also David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court:
JudicialReview in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 (2009) (offering an account of why the
Supreme Court of Japan remains arguably the most conservative constitutional court
in the world, declining to take an active role in the interpretation of Japan's
constitution and thus rejecting the strong presumption that American-style judicial
review would take hold in Japan after it was formally enabled by the post-War
constitution).
147.
See CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 3.
148.
See, e.g., Kroncke, supra note 107.
149.
See ADAMS, supra note 106 (presenting a theory of legal evolution);
MORGAN, supra note 106 (examining the evolution of peoples and their institutions
throughout history); Wilf, supra note 106 (examining the origins and evolution of the
theory of legal modernism).
150.
See generally John Fabian Witt, Crystal Eastman and the Internationalist
Beginnings of American Civil Liberties, 54 DUKE L.J. 705, 710-15 (2004) (providing
specific examples to explain that "even those features of American law that are
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paradigmatic study of what has been called the "transatlantic"
discourse is Daniel Rodgers's Atlantic Crossings.151 Rodgers
demonstrates how American legal and political developments were
influenced by European debates and that American reformers felt
free to use European examples as the basis for American social
reforms. 152 Duncan Kennedy has recently reemphasized Rodgers's
basic contention with a focus on the import of European ideas into the
153
American legal community.
The impetus and stimulation for this vigorous transatlantic
comparativism was well evidenced by the fact that many early
twentieth century legal thinkers pursued legal education in Europe,
reflecting the international prestige of European law, especially
German law. 154 In this era, it was not uncommon for leading legal
scholars to draw on a wide range of foreign sources, even beyond
Europe, for imagining the legal developments that would properly
confront the rapidly changing contours of American life.' 5 5 Thus, in
contrast to the contemporary definition of comparative law discussed
below, comparative law was not solely the isolated study of foreign
legal systems by specialized scholars, but was seen as a commitment
to comparative methodology throughout legal scholarship aimed to
15 6
produce actionable knowledge for domestic reform.
Yet, despite the impact and legacy of this more cosmopolitan era,
both Rodgers and Kennedy note, with perceivable lament, that this
comparative sentiment slowly eroded until it was wholeheartedly

typically described as distinctive ... are often the result of interactions and ideas on a
global scale").
151.
DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A
PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998).
152.
See id. at 74 (explaining America's goal to catch up with the progressive
nations of the world by borrowing their ideas).
153.
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizationsof Law and Legal Thought, in THE
NEW LAW & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 10, at 19.
154.
See David S. Clark, Tracing the Roots of American Legal Education: A
Nineteenth Century German Connection, in 1 THE HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 495, 499 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2007) (explaining that Americans
saw German law schools as the best professional preparation for a gentleman lawyer);
Mathias Reimann, A Career in Itself-The German Professoriate as a Model for
American Legal Academia, in THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON
LAW WORLD, 1820-1920, at 165, 188-94 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993) (describing the
aspects of the German model education model that attracted foreigners).
155.
See generally FRANK J. GOODNOW, 1 COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, at
iv (1893) (noting that the study of administrative law should be, like all legal analysis,
part of an inherently comparative science where "this knowledge can be obtained only
by study, and by comparison of our own with foreign administrative models").
156.
WOODROW WILSON, THE STUDY OF ADMINISTRATION 21 (Pub. Affairs Press
1955) (1886) ("But why should we not use such parts of foreign contrivances as we
want, if they be in any way serviceable? We are in no danger of using them in a foreign
way. We borrowed rice, but we do not eat it with chopsticks.").
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rejected after World War 11.157 In fact, while it is now customary to
attribute this post-World War II decline of comparativism to
America's growing international power, such an explanation wholly
misses how American lawyers simply came to treat Europe and the
rest of the industrialized world using the already extant law and
development frame.
Thus, what has been missing from this and other attempts to
explain the decline of American comparative law is the recognition
that many of those who participated in this transatlantic debate were
simultaneously engaged in law and development work elsewherework that for a time bifurcated the world between Europe and the
rest of the global community. While it was indeed true that American
legal thought was far more cosmopolitan in this and earlier eras than
traditionally recognized, this type of methodological comparativism
was geographically restricted, and existed alongside the growth of the
American lawyer's new international role as an exporter of legal
knowledge. Tying together the fall of comparativism with the origins
of law and development helps one understand the foundational
opposition of comparative methodologies and the functional
presumptions of law and development. Indeed, while some
comparativists such as Goodnow were participants in this early
history, over time foreign legal reform was seen as requiring little if
any comparative expertise. 158 Rather, it was held to be the natural
province of the American lawyer, who was ever more isolated from
the traditions of comparative law.15 9
The entrenchment of law and development as a core aspect of
American legal identity only deepened as America descended into the
Cold War. As the global ambit of American foreign policy expanded,
so did the normalization of foreign reform work. 160 In fact, a key
player in the rise of aggressive anticommunist rhetoric in American

157. * See Daniel T. Rodgers, An Age of Social Politics, in RETHINKING AMERICAN
HISTORY IN A GLOBAL AGE 250, 259-61 (Thomas Bender ed., 2002) (detailing how, even
before the World War II, those involved in the transatlantic discussion increasingly
tried to dissociate the influences of this more cosmopolitan discourse on the New Deal).
158.
For a discussion of the use and ultimate alienation of comparativists in
Latin American and Indian foreign law and development work, see Trubek & Galanter,
supra note 49 and Krishnan, supra note 57.
159.
See Otto Kahn-Freund, The Use and Misuses of ComparativeLaw, 37 MOD.
L. REV. 1, 11-13 (1974) (transforming Montesquieu's comparative law principles into
tools for American lawmakers to use in naturalizing foreign institutions); Stein, supra
note 5, at 216 ("[American] lawyers require better knowledge and deeper
understanding of the international scene and particularly of the foreign legal systems
within which their counterparts function.").
160.
See Stein, supra note 5, at 216 (explaining that after World War II, America
was the most powerful nation and with Washington no longer able to carry the burden
of advancing freedom across the globe, the burden has fallen on lawyers to advance
foreign reform).
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161
law was a once-famed comparativism advocate, Roscoe Pound.
Pound is characteristic of so many American legal scholars whose
commitment to comparative law in America was set aside for law and
development abroad-in Pound's case when he served as a legal
adviser to China's Guomindang government. 162 While Pound's
writings from the era rhetorically evoke comparative sensitivities, in
practice he sought to rewrite the entirety of China's legal system in
the image of his ideal form of American law.' 6 3 Furthermore, Pound
glossed over the authoritarianism of the GMD and became a strident
promoter of the efficacy of foreign legal reform stateside, even though
none of his reforms were implemented or even seriously considered in
164
Chinese politics.
As the Cold War progressed, the cultural politics of the Soviet
Union's foreign policy served as a strong stimulant to the growing
belief in the necessity of American foreign legal reform as an element
of anti-communism. 165 The differentiation of Soviet and American law
only intensified the cultural politics of foreign legal reform in America
166
and served to reemphasize America's humanitarian export of law.
As a result, legal comparativism could be stigmatized as unAmerican, and foreign legal ideas were commonly cast in terms of
contagion rather than inspiration. 167 Instead, the American legal
community embraced this deepening belief in the centrality of law to

161.
For works about Pound, see generally N. E. H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND
KARL LLEWELLYN (1997) and DAVID WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND: PHILOSOPHER OF LAW
(1974).
162.
Pound came to China to serve as an adviser in 1946. For examples of
Pound's comparative law works while he was in China, see Roscoe Pound, Comparative
Law and History as Bases for Chinese Law, 61 HARV. L. REV. 749 (1948), Roscoe Pound,
Progressof the Law in China, 23 WASH. L. REV. 345 (1948), and ROSCOE POUND, SOME
PROBLEMS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN CHINA (1948). For analysis of
Pound's comparative law works, see THE LAW IN CHINA AS SEEN BY ROSCOE POUND
(Tsao Wenyen ed., 1953).
163.
Jedidiah Kroncke, Roscoe Pound in China: A Lost Precedent for Liabilities
of American Exceptionalism, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2012).
164.
Id.
165.
See generally Bui Thi Bich Lien, Legal Education in TransitionalVietnam,
in ASIAN SOCIALISM AND LEGAL CHANGE 135, 150-51 (John Gillespie & Penelope
Nicholson eds., 2005) (discussing projects to support legal education and reform in
Vietnam since the early 1990s); Brian J.M. Quinn, Vietnam's Continuing Legal Reform:
Gaining Control over the Courts, 4 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 431, 434-36 (2003)
(discussing Vietnam's shift away from the Soviet court system in response to political
corruption).
166.
See WALTER L. HIXSON, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 8 (2008)
(arguing that that the need to differentiate America from the Soviets intertwined
"foreign policy and the process of creating, affirming, and disciplining conceptions of
national identity"); LAWRENCE W. SEREWICZ, AMERICA AT THE BRINK OF EMPIRE 26
(2007) ("[T]he Communist threat makes [America's foreign] aid imperative if freedom is
to survive and ripen in vast areas of the world.").
167.
GORDON, supra note 119, at 79 (describing how "red-baiting" used interest
in foreign law, such as the rights to monopolize resources and to steal property rights).
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American identity, and it became standard fare for political and legal
leaders to proclaim that the American lawyer was an essential Cold
Warrior. 168 Even for many of those who had recoiled from the
harshness of McCarthyism and who feared growing military
intervention abroad, the noncolonial aspects of law and development
remained an attractive framework. 169 Even Thurgood Marshall, who
knew the controversies of American law as well as anyone,
demonstrated his quintessentially American character when he set
170
out to write a Bill of Rights for the Kenyan constitution.
In the end, it was Talcott Parsons, a sociologist, who would most
deeply entrench law and development thinking not only in legal
thinking but also in modern development discourse most broadly.
Parsons drew on Max Weber's theories relating the rise of capitalism
to legal rationalization and placed a stylized version of this theory at
the core of the American development moment.' 71 The preeminence
that Parsons gave to law only further amplified the reformist selfimage of the American legal community abroad, and his
172
interpretation of Weber became a set of unshakable truisms.

168.
See Dwight Eisenhower, President of the U.S., Address at the 83rd Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association: The Role of Lawyers in Promoting the Rule
of Law (Aug. 29, 1960), in 36 A.B.A. J. 1095, 1096 (explaining the American lawyer's
role in seeking world peace); Robert G. Storey, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Annual
Address: Under God and the Law (Aug. 23, 1953), in 78 ANN. REP. A.B.A 322, 326
(proclaiming that it was now incumbent on the American lawyer "to bring law into the
supremacy which it must attain in a world of free men"); Earl Warren, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S., Address at the World Conference on World Peace Through
the Rule of Law: World Peace Through International Legal Consensus (Sept. 13, 1965),
in 53 KY. L.J. 5, 10 ("The lawyers of the world should be the first to agree that the
responsibility is theirs to initiate a movement to have the problems of nations solved by
means other than war.").
169.
See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, Lawyers of the Peace Corps, 48 A.B.A. J. 913,
913 (1962) ("[American lawyers] are peculiarly fitted for the task of instilling in the
people of [foreign] countries the principles of the rule of law which will allow them to
enjoy the freedoms and opportunities to which they aspire.").
170.
See MARY L. DUDZIAK, EXPORTING AMERICAN DREAMS 71 (2008) (explaining
the American sources of Marshall's enthusiasm for a bill of rights); see also Makua
Mutua, Book Review, 31 HuM. RTS. Q. 1146, 1146-49 (2009) (reviewing MARY L.
DUDZIAK, supra,and further analyzing Marshall's inspirations).
171.
See Chantal Thomas, Max Weber, Talcott Parsons and the Sociology of
Legal Reform: A Reassessment with Implications for Law and Development, 15 MINN. J.
INT'L L. 383, 416 (2006) (describing how Weber's claims about the link between legal
rationalization and the rise of capitalism had nothing to do with the common law
practices, which were considered by Weber to be neither rational nor just).
172.
Attempts to disabuse the American legal community of these truisms have
been recurrent and unsuccessful. Compare David Trubek, Max Weber on Law and the
Rise of Capitalism, 72 Wis. L. REV. 720, 720 (1972) (demanding that modern scholars
look to Weber's theory for guidance in twentieth-century problem solving through "law
and development"), and Roger Cotterrell, Legality and Political Legitimacy in the
Sociology of Max Weber, in IDEOLOGY, LEGALITY AND THE STATE 69, 70 (David
Sugarman ed., 1983) (stating the Weber's conclusions are a starting point for studies
today), with Harold Berman, Some False Promises of Max Weber's Sociology of Law, 65
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At the same time, in the wake of the entrenchment of law and
development ideas, a radical change occurred in the definition of
comparative law. In contrast to the broad methodological
comparativism of the early twentieth century, comparative law took
on a much greater taxonomic and specialized character, where
"comparative law" more often than not meant the study of a foreign
173
legal system on its own terms.
The substance of this switch was greatly affected by the inflow of
6migr6 legal scholars from Europe during and after World War II. As
this cadre of scholars took up residence in American law schools they
were often deemed "comparative lawyers" by virtue of the foreign
substance of their expertise, and not necessarily their methodological
commitments. 174 The understanding of "comparative law" as a field
predominantly staffed by European civil lawyers helped shift the field
into moribund debates about the relative taxonomy or superiority of
the two Western legal traditions. 175 Immediately in the post-World
War II era, some of these 6migr6s helped promote a domestic interest
in foreign constitutional debates, but only to the extent that such
debates could be improved through the application of American
sensibilities
expertise; far worse, many imported traditional colonial
176
way.
under
was
decolonization
as
even
from Europe
Perhaps most importantly, the critical comparative scholarship
produced within the new comparative law had little chance to affect
domestic American legal development. The marginalization of
comparative perspectives was intertwined with the new cultural
politics of American legal parochialism. 1 77 Thus, comparativism in
the production of American legal knowledge was at best marginalized
and at worst wholly dismissed by the broader legal community in
favor of law and development.

WASH. U. L.Q. 758 (1987) (analyzing and criticizing widespread acceptance of Weber's
ideas), and Robert Marsh, Weber's Misunderstandingof Traditional Chinese Law, 106
AM. J. SOC. 281 (2000) (explaining the flaws in Weber's work and suggesting that
comparative law scholars "rethink what the defining characteristics of 'modern law'
should be").
See generally RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Annelise
173.
Riles ed., 2001) (compiling examples of such comparative law pieces).
See John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law Scholarship, 21 HASTINGS
174.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 771, 781 (1997) (pointing out that there is little evidence that
foreign scholars who came to reside in American law schools in this era paid serious
attention to comparative law).
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 8-10.
175.
See David Fontana, The Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law
176.
in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 17-19 (2011) (admitting that the
"comparative constitutional law" of this era was predominantly based on an export
model of American constitutional experience).
See John H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the
177.
United States, 43. AM. J. COMP. L. 545, 548-49 (1995) (giving examples of the rare
success stories of comparative law subjects while explaining their usual place on the
fringe of legal-academic life).
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C. The CulturalPolitics of Law and Development
It has been a long-standing subject of study and commentary
that Americans, since the pre-colonial era, have seen American law as
a key aspect of America's particular, some say exceptional, place in
the world. 178 Alexis de Tocqueville's classic analysis of postRevolutionary American society is often cited for its emphasis on law
and the role of lawyers in public and private life. 179 Paul Kahn has
provided a recent articulation of this thesis, emphasizing that
America was conceived through an act of popular sovereignty and
that a foundational ritual of collective identity was an assertion of its
distinction from foreign law.' 8 0 Other scholars have compared
America's identification with law to a religious devotion unchanged
18 1
into the present era.
However intense this association was, recent scholarship shows
that in the international arena, this strong sense of exceptional law
or legality was tightly constrained by the reality of America's
practical status as a fledging postcolonial nation. Prior to the
twentieth century, Americans were more interested in gaining a
sense of parity and respect in the arena of international law than
rhetorical assertions concerning America's exceptional legal character
might misleadingly represent.' 8 2 While some American lawyers
proudly trumpeted American law in foreign contexts, especially the

See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM 40 (1996)
178.
(describing the uniquely powerful role that American lawyers have); ANDERS
STEPHANSON, MANIFEST DESTINY 25 (1995) (explaining the legal justifications that
American expansion relied on); Michael Kammen, The Problem of American
Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration, 45 AM. Q. 1, 5 (1993) (showing that current
scholarship on tax laws, among other things, suggests America's exceptional position).
See generally IS AMERICA DIFFERENT? (Byron E. Shafer ed., 1991) (compiling various
articles discussing the notion of American exceptionalism).
179.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835); see also ROBERT
A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 12 (1984) (explaining that de
Toqueville equated the legal profession to an "intellectual aristocracy"); ROBERT
STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 14 (1983) (citing de Toqueville's perceptions of America's class
system); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1988)
(noting de Toqueville's view of American lawyers as part of a separate class in society).
180.
Paul Kahn, American Exceptionalism, PopularSovereignty, and the Rule of
Law, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 204 (Michael Ignatieff ed.,
2005).
181.
See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 180 (1988) (regarding the
Constitution as the "focus of a faith community"); Steven Calebresi, A Shining City on
a Hill: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on
Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335, 1382 (2006) (claiming that America's moralistic
foreign policy stems from its unique devotion to religion).
182.
See generally David M. Golove & Daniel L. Hulesbosch, A Civilized Nation:
The Early American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International
Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932 (2010) (arguing that the primary purpose of
enacting the American Constitution was to promote America as a "civilized state").
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achievement of the American Constitution, 183 it was not until the
turn of the twentieth century that America as a nation both
internationalized and was able to confidently assert its exceptional
18 4
legal character in the form of an active foreign policy overseas.
The history just outlined demonstrates how the idea that modern
law could stand as a scientific basis for the professional authority of
the American lawyer, domestically and internationally, penetrated
deep into the American legal community. This was an idea that
appealed to a nation soothed by the thought that American law could
convert foreign citizens abroad, as it was doing domestically.18 5 The
historical narrative that American law had achieved an evolutionary
86
leap forward became the normalized backdrop of the profession.
Although Robert Gordon has shown the often ambivalent and
inconsistent contribution of lawyers to the health of the rule of law in
American legal history, such a historical contribution is today taken
as a given.18 7 The components of this cultural framework would
change somewhat over the course of the twentieth century, but the
framework became settled into what Frank Upham labeled the
"mythmaking orthodoxy.' 88 Such orthodoxy insists that American
law can be described accurately by abstract ideals such as the "rule of

183.
See generally GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
HEARD ROUND THE WORLD, 1776-1989 (2009) (demonstrating how the American pride
in their Constitution spread globally).
184.
Scholars of American foreign policy have long noted that idealized versions
of American history are normatively structured and are offered as carrying implied
lessons for foreign nations. See RUSSELL L. HANSON, THE DEMOCRATIC IMAGINATION IN
AMERICA 424 (1985); HIXSON, supra note 166, at 9.
185.
See Matthew J. Lindsay, Preserving the Exceptional Republic: Political
Economy, Race, and the Federalizationof American Immigration Law, 17 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN'. 181 (2005) (discussing America's strong policing of immigrants and views that
the assimilation could occur abroad as well); Adam McKeown, Ritualization of
Regulation: The Enforcement of Chinese Exclusion in the United States and China, 108
AM. HIST. REV. 377, 385-91 (2003) (discussing the American immigrant exclusion effort
as it related to Chinese immigrants).
186.
Robert W. Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017,
1038 (1981) (explaining that American lawyers promised they could guarantee liberty
better than other learned elites); Christopher Tomlins, Framing the Field of Law's
Disciplinary Encounters: A Historical Narrative, 34 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 911, 925 (2000)
(discussing the prominence of legal discourse as a "policy language").
187.
Robert W. Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producingthe Rule of Law: Some
Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 441 (2010). Contra Walter Dellinger &
Samuel P. Fried, Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: How the U.S. Legal and Business
Communities Can Help, 82 WORLD POL'Y J. 79, 82-83 (2003) ("[Ihe U.S. legal
community is uniquely qualified to help promote the rule of law for the simple reasons
that we have been doing it for decades here at home and we possess the know-how and
the resources to launch and sustain this effort abroad.").
188.
UPHAM, supra note 92.

20121

LA WAND DEVELOPMENTAS ANTI-COMPARATIVE LAW

517

law," when in fact American law is rife with a range of legal and
189
nonlegal values.
This history demonstrates that in contrast to the more technical
or operational terms of the field's cyclical self-critiques, the paradox
of law and development is a permutation of this traditional American
focus on legal identity. Although in many ways enabled and given
specific character by the standardization of modern American law
discussed earlier, the function and perpetuation of the paradox itself
is best understood using the terms of cultural analysis advanced by
legal scholars working today in the fields of cultural cognition' 9" or
expressive law. 191 Common to these approaches is recognition that
the symbolic aspects of law are crucial to the interpretive framework.
Popular and professional legal actors use this framework to interpret
empirical phenomena, and through it they can explain away such
192
data's conflict with preexisting world views.
The fact that law and development became a defining
characteristic of American legal identity during this crucible era of
the new humanitarian internationalism-even in places like China
where American interests were remote and influence negligibleallows one to decenter explaining the longitudinal paradox of law and
development in material or logistical terms, and moves one to
understanding the persistence of law and development as a form of
cultural identity politics. Law and development came to supplant and
supersede comparativism in American legal culture, but not due to its
superiority in explaining or influencing foreign legal developments.
Quite the opposite was true, namely, that from its inception in China
and elsewhere, law and development grew and thrived because it was
tied to both the new professional self-image of American lawyers, an
expression of their assertions of scientific legal expertise, and a ritual
of their role central in American internationalism.
Within American society, foreign legal reform is likely one of the
most successful examples of what cultural cognition scholars Dan
Kahan and Donald Braman have called "successful cultural

189.
Upham notes how the American judiciary is permeated by politics and that
"federalism guarantees, indeed celebrates, national inconsistencies in legal rules and
results," leading to forum shopping. He further examines how one can make arguments
on behalf of the jury system, but that "fidelity to the rule of law is not one of them."
UPHAM, supranote 92, at 17.
190.
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149 (2006). See generally CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT,

http://culturalcognition.net (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (compiling research on how
cultural values affect policy beliefs).
191.
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
GeneralRestatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503 (2000). Disciplines such as legal sociology
and legal anthropology have long explored the cultural aspects of law in a range of
different societies. See ROGER COTTERELL, LAw, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY (2006).

192.

See Kahan & Braman, supra note 190.
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policymaking."'193 Almost the entire spectrum of American politics has
consistently supported foreign legal reform efforts.' 94 While many
American legal debates continue to be acrimonious domestically,
there is a shared vision of American legal reform abroad to which all
American lawyers can contribute and endorse. This is why Tamanaha
can identify the ways in which polar opposite American legal
philosophies can infuse opposing visions of foreign legal change into
law and development, and American law's role therein. 195 Such
successful "cultural policymaking" inherently precludes law and
development work in areas that are too controversial and would
destabilize this harmony. This explains why very little law and
development work confronts the issue of structural economic
inequality inherent in modern capitalism or suggests the export of
196
American labor rights over property rights.
When we turn to the recurrent flaws that set law and
law-formalism,
comparative
with
odds
at
development
instrumentalism, and idealization-we can see that whatever
problems these flaws pose for the actual success of law and
development's practical aspirations, they are in fact core virtues for
sustaining the cultural politics of law and development within
American legal culture. All of these flaws serve to facilitate the
continued health of the presumption that America is solely an
exporter of law abroad and does so in a manner that both smoothes
over domestic disagreements while reinforcing the paradoxical notion
that the export of American law can be simultaneously an apolitical
process while ever expressive of the most broadly shared American
legal ideals. Thus, law and development's inability to learn from its
failures is an inherent aspect of its function as an expressive mode of
cultural politics.
This collective image of the American lawyer abroad has become
the baseline assumption with which all American lawyers are
socialized. A cultural framework allows one to make sense of the
inherent optimism that propels law and development and the

Id.
193.
194.
See generally CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that multiple
presidential administrations of both political parties have championed foreign
democratic development).
Tamanaha, supra note 32, at 225, 232 (identifying the "progressive law and
195.
development package" and the "law and capitalism package").
See MARK SIDEL, LAW AND SOCIETY IN VIETNAM 8 (2008) (explaining the
196.
phenomenon in Vietnam); Philip Selznick, American Society and the Rule of Law, 33
SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 29, 33 (2006) ("The history shows that American effort to make
good the promise of the rule of law has been very difficult ... as during the great
conflicts between capital and labor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.");
Stephen Golub, Beyond Rule of Law Orthodoxy 22 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l
Peace, Working Paper No. 41, 2003) (explaining lawyers' tendency to minimize "the
many other factors and actors that affect legal systems development .... ").
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consistent reference scholars and practitioners make to the power of
its "special mission" or invoke an amorphous, but positive,
"instinctive sense" about such work. 197 On a structural level, the
normalization of law and development in American legal culture
explains why there is an endlessly recurring circulation of new
lawyers in and out of foreign reform projects, 19 8 even when few
experience individual success. While law and development scholars
and career practitioners may engage in more sophisticated inquiries
that at times verge on actual comparative law, such debates are not
only generally far removed from popular discussions, 19 9 but are
disciplined by their need to engage with the ingrained general
200
presumptions of the American legal community.
In sum, the actual origins of law and development provide a
deeper and more expansive history of failure that deflates the
generalized optimism still expressed about the prospects of American
foreign legal reform efforts. This history also enables us to
understand why law and development ultimately speaks not to how
we have-or have not-had an impact on other societies, but to the
way law and development expresses and affirms a foundational
aspect of modern American legal identity. We turn now to an
explication of how the inherent resistance of law and development to
destabilizing empirical data presents a set of increasingly problematic
liabilities that should shift discussions away from abandoning the
field because of its inefficacy as a humanitarian policy to the hard
road of instead linking it to American self-interest.

197.
THOMAS CAROTHERS, ASSESSING DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: THE CASE OF
ROMANIA 132 (1996) (admitting that the popularity of these efforts "depend[s] less on
the specific impact of the assistance on others than on what the assistance says and
means about ourselves").
See CHANNEL, supra note 37, at 4 (criticizing the lack of ownership,
198.
insufficient resources, and excessive segmentation in the law and development
movement).
199.
See id. at 4 (discussing similar insights that have been made); Linn
Hammergren, InternationalAssistance to Latin American Justice Program, in BEYOND
COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 14, at
321-22 (noting the general lack of serious comparative evaluations).
200.
See McAuslan, supra note 78, at 41-42 (noting that the average American
lawyer has internalized this stylized development history and, further, has little basis
to reflexively question the export of areas of American law in which he has neither a
particular stake nor expertise); Martin Shapiro, Courts in Authoritarian Regimes, in
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, supra note 72, at
326 (explaining the movement away from the presumption that every comparative
study needed to concentrate on U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
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IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LIABILITIES OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT'S
MIRRORED LENS

The deep history of law and development's failures and its direct
relationship with the rejection of early twentieth century
comparativism provides a sobering rebuttal to the recurrent claims of
optimism that undergirds its contemporary practice. Neither its dire
empirical track record nor its inherent conceptual flaws establish any
real basis for sober expectations of future rehabilitation. However,
this Part and the subsequent Part argue that discussions of law and
development's failure must move beyond mere considerations of its
efficacy as an instrument for influencing foreign development, and
begin to assess the self-interested concerns about the troubling
liabilities that the cultural politics of law and development pose for
the American legal community in the twenty-first century. To this
end, this Part outlines how the normalization of law and development
has inculcated in American interpretations of foreign legal
development a mirrored lens that trades clear-sighted analysis for
warped perceptions in order to sustain the assumption that America
is solely an exporter of legal knowledge.
A. Accepting the Limits of American Legal Expertise Abroad
The early history of law and development reveals how enmeshed
the origins of the modern professional image of American lawyers
were in forwarding assertions about the authority of legal expertise
as a form of apolitical science. Such belief was central to a great deal
of the legal developments that shaped modern American law, and it
co-evolved with the spread of legal standardization
and
nationalization at the turn of twentieth century. In some ways, it was
natural then for American lawyers to take abroad this same faith in
the scientific universality of law as they undertook foreign legal
reform. Yet, history shows that whatever purchase this belief had
historically, it has never been validated as an effective tool for
engaging with foreign law.
The deep faith of American lawyers in the liberalizing potential
of law is inextricably tied to the cultural politics that have long
sustained law and development. Coupled with collective and
individual humanitarian impulses, defenders of law and development
have never been able to accept the possibility that our legal expertise
as American lawyers-however valuable it may be domestically-is
orthogonal to foreign legal systems, much less a cure-all for inducing
the rule of law, democracy, or other more general legal ideals. In this
way, Robert Gordon's suggestion that direct and open political
advocacy may be the best route for inspiring what we consider
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positive legal changes abroad is significantly more challenging than
his subtle and velvet-gloved analysis suggests. 201 It asks that if we
seek to impact developments abroad, we set aside our professional
of authority and expertise to
identity and act without the trappings
20 2
which we have become so accustomed.
From the more specific vantage point of simple cost-benefit
analysis, the track record of law and development has to be more
broadly reconciled with the ongoing debates about foreign aid writ
large. 20 3 While most of the self-critiques of law and development
parallel the identified pitfalls of development work more broadly,
legal reform work has remained relatively insulated from the rigorous
criticism voiced in foreign aid scholarship. These critiques have not
only questioned the productivity of aid as a general enterprise, but
scientifically
deeply questioned the field's ability to ever produce
20 4
objective metrics for evaluating its success or failure.
Now, let us step back for a moment and simply countenance law
and development's century long record of failure alongside the
general debates on foreign aid. So much of the search for effective aid
interventions has come to focus on the comparative economy of
various aid methods. The Millennium Development Goals are a wellknown attempt to prioritize the deployment of limited aid dollars to
confront humanitarian needs. 20 5 The results of such work have
primarily prioritized public health vectors such as access to clean
water, basic micronutrients, and forms of preventative medicine.
Given the amount of time and money expended by the panoply of
individuals and organization engaged in law and development work,
where would foreign legal reform comparatively rank on this scale
over the past century?20 6 In comparison to clean drinking water? Or
even direct cash transfers? 20 7 And moreover, when proper weight is
2 08
given to unintended consequences?

201.
GORDON, supra note 179, at 10-11.
See id. at 59-65 (discussing the trappings in the lawyering profession).
202.
WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN (2006); William Easterly &
203.
Tobias Pfutze, Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid, 22
J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (2008).
204.
Compare HAMMERGREN, ENVISIONING REFORM, supra note 42, at 314
(noting law and development's rejection of experimental methods), with Abhijit V.
Banerjee & Esther Duflo, The Experimental Approach to Development Economics (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14467, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/ papers/w14467.pdf (advocating experimental methods in
development economics).
See We Can End Poverty: 2015 Millenium Development Goals, UNITED
205.
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/millenniumgoals (last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (providing
information about the current UN work on the Millienium Development Goals).
CAROTHERS, supra note 21, at 264 (noting the high salaries involved in
206.
legal work).
207.
There has been recognition that legal problems are often simply issues of
funding. See Rebecca Nelson, Regulating GrasslandDegradation in China: Shallow
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The great seduction of law and development has been that it
offers so much more than just the terms of any given project.
Programs aimed at promoting judicial independence or American
forms of legal education conjure up the possibility that small
successes, ever on the horizon, can lead to catalytic changes that will
be socially transformative and thus generate exponential multiplier
effect upon multiplier effect. Yet, at the same time, it has been
exactly these very developmental effects that law and development
has failed to ever produce. Individual projects have from time to time
delivered on smaller scale aspirations such as temporarily improving
20 9
docket-clearing rates or winning specific public interest cases.
However, such programs are not ultimately evaluated on the basis of
whether these specific outcomes are economical, but on imagining
that these outcomes will trigger a developmental chain that invokes
replicating stylized visions of our legal development.
Thus, on a collective and individual level, American lawyers
must ask themselves, even from a purely humanitarian perspective,
whether it is best to attempt to improve the life of others abroad
through their expertise as lawyers per se. As will be discussed
shortly, this is not commensurate with a call for some form of legal
isolationism or nonengagement. However, to the degree that we
inevitably collaborate with foreign lawyers and reformers eager to
learn from the American experience, the law and development only
clouds and perverts such interface by articulating aspirations derived
from a mirrored lens that speaks to our professional identity rather
than to the difficult questions posed by our extant track record
abroad.
B. Authoritarianismand Recognizing Unintended Consequences
Pulling back from the more generalized question of the
comparative utility of legal expertise in development, there are clear
and definitive ways in which the history of law and development has

Rooted Laws?, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 417 (2006) (citing China's decentralized
funding structure as an important obstacle to preventing land degradation); Srini
Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of Enforcement, and
Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COL. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POLY
37 (2007) (noting the need to create a more centralized administrative agency and
increase funding to improve the administration of environmental laws).
208.
See generally Mariana Mota Prado, The Paradox of Rule of Law Reforms:
How Early Reforms Can Create Obstacles to Future Ones, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 555, 556
(2010) (explaining that reforms create practices that will block future reforms and
strengthen interest groups that will resist future reforms).
209.
See Scott L. Cummings & Louise G. Trubek, Globalizing Public Interest
Law, 13 UCLA J. INT'L & FOREIGN AFF. 1 (2009) (examining the successes of the public
interest law in the post-Cold War era); Hammergren, supra note 199, at 322 (noting
the limited scale of success in development projects in Latin America).
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repeatedly shown how the attitudes and assumptions of the field
warp our ability to understand and accept legal developments abroad
on their own terms. Herein, we turn away from questions of
measuring the efficacy of attempts to induce change abroad to more
self-interested questions about America's ability to evaluate and
adapt to foreign legal developments in an increasingly competitive
world. In other words, the world has changed and it is an increasingly
serious liability that America has consistently misjudged the
direction and status of foreign legal systems based on the aspirations
and assumptions of law and development.
The most striking example of this misjudgment has been
America's collective track record in engaging authoritarian regimes.
Core to the faith in legal instrumentalism inherent in law and
development work is that, even in politically unfavorable climates,
transfers of American law can longitudinally lead to liberalizing
effects. 210 Further, the implicit belief that foreign systems will follow
the same imagined developmental trajectory as America has led to a
belief that such transfers-again often divorced from their domestic
controversies-can have predictable effects. 211 Such teleological
presumptions are amplified by the general aversion in American law
to the most difficult questions at the heart of democratization studies,
that is, the distributive or structural issues of economic and political
power. 212 Instead, law and development theories have chosen to focus
on the seductive allure of more generalized evolutionary notions of
social development-so broad as to elide distributive debates.
these
tested
have
repeatedly
regimes
Authoritarian
presumptions in large part through their willingness to be open
spaces for law and development work. 213 However, there has been a
persistent if not instinctive presumption that authoritarian regimes
would prefer practices of arbitrary rule. 214 This presumption has
resonated with the common liberatory view of American law. America
has often engaged in legal work in authoritarian regimes based on
eventually undermine
work would
the faith that such
authoritarianism or faith in the purportedly self-evident moral virtue

210.
211.
212.

Trubek & Santos, supra note 10, at 4.
See supra note 107.
Golub, supra note 26.

213.

See generally RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN

REGIMES, supra note 72 (compiling discussions of the functions of courts in
authoritarian politics).
STATE AND LAW IN EASTERN ASIA 143 (Leslie Palmiera ed., 1996) ("[I]t is
214.
probably safe to assume that all governments would prefer the convenience of arbitrary
rule, and abjure it only when compelled."); C. Neal Tate & Torbjbrn Vallinder, The
Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The Judicializationof Politics, in THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 1, 3 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995)
(referring to judicialization as a "gospel").
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of authoritarians who indicate such virtue by claiming to support law
215
and development work.
Yet, throughout the twentieth century, authoritarian and even
fascist regimes have not shied away from developing instrumental
law or what is now considered "thin" rule of law principles. 216 In fact,
the attraction of authoritarian regimes to the rule of law is not a new
concept historically speaking. A range of scholars describe the predemocratic origins of rule of law ideals 2 17 as well as its common law
genesis as a result of elite power struggles in England. 2 18 Scholars
also note the way that fascism in Germany was compatible with
procedural notions of the rule of law. 219 Others have even cited the
complicated relationship between the rule of law and antimajoritarian debates in U.S. history. 220 Thus, it should not be wholly
surprising that reference to rule of law ideals has now become the
221
norm for contemporary authoritarian regimes.
However, there is a growing body of evidence that shows how
promoting instrumental legal development abroad may be
strengthening
authoritarianism
and
actively
undermining
liberalization. In their recent collection on the subject, Thomas
Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa describe how modern authoritarian
regimes have recognized the utility of efficient and consistent legal
institutions. 22 2 Others note how authoritarian regimes successfully
use law to create a greater capacity for self-reform through internal
reallocations of power. 2 23 Still others have discussed how legal

215.
For the first wave of authoritarian regimes supported by America, see
ROBERT A. PACKENHAM, LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD (1973).
216.
Ronald J. Daniels & Michael Trebilcock, The Political Economy of Rule of
Law in Developing Countries, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 100, 106 (2004); Peerenboom, supra
note 10, at 37. Contra Thomas Carothers, The "Sequencing"Fallacy, 18 J. DEMOCRACY
12, 26 (2007); Michael McFaul & Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, The Myth of the Authoritarian
Model, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 68, 68 (2008).
217.
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 9, at 28-29 (tracing the origins of rule of law in
the West to the Ancient Greeks).
218.
Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western
Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 209 (1994).
219.
DAVID DYZENAHUs, LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY (1997); JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW 221 (1979).
220.
Amy Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm
for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1998).
221.
See Salas, supra note 36, at 46 (noting that authoritarian forces have
invoked rule of law principles in political contexts, calling for judicial "renovation"); see
also supra note 72.
222.
RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES, supra
note 72, at 4 (noting five areas of such utility: social control, legitimation, controlling
administrative agents and maintaining elite cohesion, credible commitments in the
economic sphere, and delegation of controversial reforms to judicial institutions).
223.
Sophie
Richardson,
Self-Reform
Within Authoritarian Regimes:
Reallocations of Power in Contemporary China, in POLITICAL CIVILIZATION AND
MODERNIZATION IN CHINA 149, 151 (Yang Zhong & Shiping Hua eds., 2006) (arguing
that reforms in China have helped "shift power away from the central state").
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224
strategies have indirectly legitimated existing state institutions,
especially as the internationalization inherent in participating in
legal reform projects allows foreign elites of many persuasions to
manipulate the resources of such efforts to their own ends and
improve their public image. 225 Not surprisingly, a great deal of
attention is given in this new work to the prevalent effects of
strategic manipulation of judicial elites and adaptations to the
American emphasis on judicial independence. 226 Further, the
proliferating popularity of anti-corruption frames in law and
development has led authoritarian regimes to recast political foes as
"corrupt" and so legitimize the exertion of centralized authority. 227
Summarily, most of this recent analysis centers on how such
instrumental reforms lead not to developmental change but to the
entrenchment of existing elite power in authoritarian regimes. 228
Many of these newer studies replicate the findings of the decades
old analysis by law and development dissident James Gardner.
Gardner was an ex-rule-of-law practitioner who was involved in the
229
early Latin American efforts described by Trubek and Galanter.
Although he wrote the most extensive critique of his generation, he is

224.
See Mark F. Massoud, Myth Making and the Collusion of Rights: Law and
Development in Sudan 37 (Oct. 23, 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of California,
Berkeley)
available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1288821 (discussing how attempts at increasing awareness of legal rights
in oppressive regimes can actually "perversely create and sustain a myth of rights that
ultimately provides leverage and legitimacy to the government that the civil society
seeks to de-legitimate").
225.
See DEZALAY & GARTH, supranote 40, at 7; see also Karen E. Bravo, Smoke,
Mirrors, and the Joker in the Pack: On Transitioningto Democracy and the Rule of Law
in Post-Soviet Armenia, 29 HoUS. J. INT'L L. 489, 575 (2007) ("Members of the
governing elite educated in the West, or through trainings in democracy and the rule of
law funded by Western taxpayers, are familiar with the images the West yearns for
and expects to see.").
226.
See generally LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY AND
DICTATORSHIP (2007) (arguing that the apolitical roots of the Chilean judicial system
yielded a structure with insufficient incentives for judicial independence); TAMIR
MOUSTAFA, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (2007) (analyzing the
development of judicial independence in the Egyptian Supreme Court); ANTHONY
PEREIRA, POLITICAL (IN)JUSTICE (2005) (assessing the role of the judiciary in the
support of authoritarian regimes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile).
227.
See Sarah Bracking, Political Development and Corruption: Why 'Right
Here, Right Now!'?, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT 3, 11-12 (Sarah Bracking ed.,
2007) (discussing how the discourse of anti-corruption can be used in many contexts,
including to discredit rivals in power struggles); see also Sundhya Pahuja, Global
Formations:IMF Conditionality and the South as Legal Subject, in CRITICAL BEINGS
161, 171-75 (Peter Fitzpatrick & Patricia Tuitt eds., 2004) (describing the adoption of
anti-corruption rhetoric by elites to suppress local interests).
228.
Thomas Walde & James Gunderson, Legislative Reform in Transition
Economies, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR INSTITUTIONAL
TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 40, at 52.
229.
See generally JAMES GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM (1980) (analyzing
American legal assistance to Latin America).
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decidedly less well known, in part because he did not continue to
write or teach in law, but also because of the nature of his critique.
Gardner wrote about the first wave of rule of law promotion and its
"vulnerability to authoritarian ordering and abuse ...converting law
230
into an instrument and exercise of repressive policy and power.
Even further, he claimed that the substance of American legal
institutions and practices are themselves inherently prone to
authoritarianism-a line even those affiliated with Critical Legal
Studies within the American academy often shy away from crossing
when abroad.
In doing so, Gardner committed what this Article will call the
"Gardner Taboo." That is, he transgressed the normative practice
among ex-practitioners of not linking failed law and development
efforts to the strengthening of authoritarian regimes, or to
recognizing the negative effects of law and development beyond
simple inefficacy. 231 As discussed earlier, the norm of self-critique is
to portray failures as both benign and redeemable with further
experience. In contrast, Gardner failed to express a favorable thought
toward the amelioration of this vulnerability through continued selfcritique and renewed effort.
There is likely no better modern example of the Gardner Taboo
than the case of China. Although the early history of American law
and development in China described in Part III is often forgotten,
after China's global reopening in the 1970s, Americans again rushed
to imagine shaping the course of the country's legal reform. 232 As
noted, they promptly began to participate in the cyclical paradox of
law and development work. 2 33 Many China law scholars have been
loathe to transgress the Gardner Taboo, especially as China has been
so popular for the "Trojan Horse" view of legal work in authoritarian
234
settings.
However, in recent years the surprising-to-some ability of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to use legal methods to

230.
See id. at 5.
231.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 79, at 553 ("In short, the claim here is not that
universalistic theories of law and development should be rejected out of hand. Rather,
they should be regarded skeptically, and each one ought to be tested against a powerful
set of objections to which even the most sophisticated theories of this kind have proven
vulnerable.").
232.
See generally Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform After
Twenty Years, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 383 (2000) (describing reforms in China over
the last twenty years, discussing the United States' involvement in some of these
reforms, and recommending that the United States use restraint in attempting to
reform Chinese law).
233.
CHRISTOPHER JESPERSEN, AMERICAN IMAGES OF CHINA 188 (1996).
234.
See Alford, supra note 47, at 1708 (arguing that such "promotion must
account for unintended and undesired consequences"); see also Stephenson, supra note
74, at 78-80 (explaining how the United States is employing a "Trojan Horse" strategy
to encourage reform in China).
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simultaneously bolster its regime while repressing dissent 23 5 has led
23 6
to a new wave of critical scholarship in and outside of legal circles.
State power has been described as being reorganized through law, or
what Lubman described as the process as "legalization."237 Several
authors have focused on how improvements in instrumental law have
strengthened the regime's legitimacy, both domestically 23 8 and
internationally. 239 The CCP also strategically deployed the legal
terms of international discourse to legitimize its actions, using
'240
concepts such as "eminent domain," "corruption," and "terrorism.

235.
See SARAH BIDDULPH, LEGAL REFORM AND ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION IN
CHINA (2007); see also Fu Hualing, Commentary, "TransformingFamily Law in PostDeng China," 191 CHINA Q. 696, 697 (2007) ("[T]he paradox in the Chinese political and
legal reform is the contrast between severe repression in core policy areas and the lack
of restrictions in peripheral areas."). But see Flora Sapio, Shuanggui and Extralegal
Detention in China, 22 CHINA INFO. 7, 24-25 (2008) (discussing an extralegal Chinese
method of detaining those suspected of corruption that still operates outside the law,
but is being reformed).
236.
See
generally
Andrew
Nathan,
Authoritarian
Resilience:
Institutionalization and the Transition to China's Fourth Generation, in US-CHINA
RELATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 13 (Christopher Marsh & June Dreyer eds.,
2003) (analyzing the surprising resilience of a reconsolidated authoritarian Chinese
regime).
237.
See Lubman, supra note 232, at 384 (defining "legalization" as a "basis for
law reform" that was "established when the leadership affirmed the position of law as a
source of authoritative rules"); see, e.g., KEVIN O'BRIEN, REFORM WITHOUT
LIBERALIZATION 178 (1990) (discussing the CCP's efforts in the 1980s to restructure
and reorganize the political system to create more stability and predictability).
238.
See Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in Contemporary Chinese
Courts, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 163, 163 (Karen G. Turner et al.
eds., 2000) (discussing China's expressed commitment to predictability and the "rule of
law," though also exposing China's ambivalence about this concept and its allowance of
discretion); see also Robert C. Berring, Chinese Law, Trade, and the New Century, 20
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 425, 431-36 (2000) ("[L]aw and legality are one of the routes that
the Chinese government has seen as a means to entry into the world trading order.");
Pitman B. Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China,
138 CHINA Q. 325, 358 (1994) ("Regardless of the eventual outcome, the post-Mao
regime's decision to ride the tiger of legal reform has created an interdependency
between legal culture and political legitimacy for the first time in the PRC's history.").
239.
See Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System:
Challenges of Participation, 191 CHINA Q. 699, 710-13 (2007) (discussing China's
efforts to become involved and respected in the field of international human rights);
Nicole Schulte-Kulkmann, US-China Legal Cooperation, 42 CHINA ANALYSIS 1, 8
(2005) (describing various mutually beneficial interactions between Western states and
China).
240.
See Tahirih V. Lee, The United States Court for China:A Triumph of Local
Law, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 923, 1014 (2004) (describing some of the local laws made by the
Shanghai Municipal Court, including ones that incorporate the concept of eminent
domain); see also Christopher Chaney, The Despotic State Department in Refugee Law:
Charting Legal Fictions to Support Falun Gong Asylum Claims 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. 130, 132 (2005) (discussing the PRC's vilification of Falun Gong as an
"impermissible social entity" and a "heretical cult"); Pamela N. Phan, Enriching the
Land or the Political Elite? Lessons from China on Democratization of the Urban
Renewal Process, 14 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 607, 639-45 (2005) (describing China's use
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Thus, the net effect of these adaptations is a greater and more
coherent institutionalization of governmental power 24 1 and the cooptation of the private elite, who were long presumed to be the
vanguard of liberalization in authoritarian regimes. 24 2 Many scholars
have noted how the supposed liberalizing force of promoting legal
professionalization has instead led to an emergent private legal
practice that is deeply dependent on the state. 243 Even the promotion
of public interest lawyering in China has raised questions as to what
extent authoritarian regimes can use lawsuits against the state as
both information gathering tools and to improve the provision of
public goods.

244

The sum force of these studies on law and development's
historical and contemporary interface with authoritarianism compels
us to move beyond arguments about the comparative disadvantage of
legal work within the development world. They require us to measure
this already shaky record of inefficacy not against inaction, but
against the very real dangers of countervailing instrumental and
developmental effects. At the most fundamental level, these
countervailing effects are simply one aspect of how the assumptions
built into law and development have warped our ability to not only

of a similar concept to eminent domain, but suggesting that their use of this concept
should be carefully tailored to their own culture).
See Mark Sidel, Dissident and Liberal Legal Scholars and Organization in
241.
Beijing and the Chinese State in the 1980's, in URBAN SPACES IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA
326, 345 (Deborah S. Davis et al. eds., 1995) ("[S]tate intrusion continues to occur in
specific areas, and that intrusion is specifically legitimized and fortified by law.").
See Bruce Dickson, Do Good Businessmen Make Good Citizens?, in
242.
CHANGING MEANINGS OF CITIZENSHIP IN MODERN CHINA 255, 286 (Merle Goldman &
Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2002) (discussing the fact that Chinese entrepreneurs seek to
become "embedded in the state" rather than create political change); see also David
S.G. Goodman, The New Middle Class, in THE PARADOX OF CHINA'S POST-MAO
REFORMS 241, 260-61 (Merle Goldman & Roderick MacFarquhar eds., 1999)
("Politically, the new middle classes, far from being alienated from the party-state or
seeking their own political voice, appear to be operating in close proximity and through
close cooperation [with the party-state]."); Liu Xiaobo, China's Robber Barons, 2 CHINA
RTS. F. 1, 1 (2003) (discussing how the Chinese elite benefit disproportionately from the
state's reforms of property ownership).
See generally Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and
243.
Institutional Continuity in China's Transition from Socialism, 113 AM. J. SOC. 352
(2007) (discussing reforms made in the Chinese legal profession that have
paradoxically caused many lawyers to become more embedded in the state); Ethan
Michelson, Unhooking from the State: Chinese Lawyers in Transition (Aug. 2003)
available at
Chicago),
of
University
dissertation,
Ph.D.
(unpublished
http://www.indiana.edu/-emsoc/Dissertation.html (same).
See Eva Pils, Asking the Tiger for His Skin: Rights Activism in China, 30
244.
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1209, 1209-12 (2006) (describing other tactics that human rights
lawyers in China employ to encourage legal change); see also Wang Yi, Human Rights
Lawyers and the Rule-of-Law Camp, 3 CHINA RTS. F. 1, 2 (2006) (outlining the extreme
restrictions on Chinese lawyers).
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understand foreign legal developments on their own terms, but
interact productively with foreign legal counterparts.
C. Blinding Reformers, Blinding Ourselves
Most law and development critiques focus on how the classic
245
flaws of the field militate against effective implementation.
However, at a much more basic level these flaws undermine the very
transmission of legal information between America and foreign legal
actors. All the traditional law and development characteristics of
formalism, instrumentalism, and idealization act to fundamentally
warp how foreign actors are able to interpret American law. The
consistent idealization of our experience in instrumental models both
inhibits our constructive participation in cooperative international
legal dialogue and undermines the possibility that foreign legal
experts might be able to critically integrate the American legal
experience into their own contexts. Such is a core international
liability of law and development.
Some comparative scholars have already noted the effect of law
and development's disruption of clear and productive international
legal exchange. 246 Certainly, there is no small demand
internationally for assistance in legal reform efforts by a number of
interested-though not always representative-parties in foreign
countries. 24 7 Many activists abroad are fighting for social change that
most Americans would see as normative, and have sought assistance
in constructing legal strategies. 248 Even those critical of American
24 9
law have embraced ideals such as the rule of law.
Yet, while idealizing the American legal experience is central to
the cultural politics of law and development, it has often misled

245.
See infra Part II.B.
246.
OHNESORGE, supra note 85, at 302-06 (calling for practitioners to be candid
about U.S. experience and models).
247.
TAMANAHA, supra note 9, at 2-4 (noting that support for the rule of law and
rhetoric purporting to support the rule of law is present across the world in numerous
different countries).
248.
See generally P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson, Overview: Confronting the
Dilemmas of Development Through Law, in THE LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
THE THIRD WORLD 1 (P. Ebow Bondzi-Simpson ed., 1992) (outlining the various legal
tools and organizations that are available to help establish economic development).
249.
See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law, Politics, and the Subaltern in
Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW 1, 12
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & Cbsar Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005). When famed
Marxist E.P. Thompson judged rule of law ideals a universal human good he sparked
debate among Marxist theorists who could not disassociate such affirmation from
imperialism. E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 262-66 (1975) (discussing the
importance of the rule of law); see also Daniel H. Cole, 'An Unqualified Human Good':
E.P. Thompson and the Rule of Law, 28 J.L. & SOc'Y 177, 182 (2001) ("This assertion of
the intrinsic virtue of the Rule of Law, far more I suspect than his denunciations of
simplistic Marxist dogmas, stunned Thompson's colleagues on the left.").
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foreign legal reformers who take such representations on face value
and then confront great difficulty when applying them in practical
terms. 250 The idea that there is a ready-made "American model" also
grates against the nationalist sensibilities of other nations-a charge
that authoritarian regimes have used selectively. 25 1 Law and
development further privileges those foreign actors who are willing to
affirm the self-image of American reformers, in exchange for quite
real financial and material rewards, over those who are often far
more embedded in domestic politics. 252 The material and symbolic
incentives of participating in American reform projects can even draw
such domestically embedded actors away from more effective, locally
driven engagements. 253 More generally, the eventual failure of the
aspirational promises that law and development offers creates not
only cynicism about legal reform itself abroad, 254 but also creates a

250.
See Michael Dowdle, Preserving Indigenous Paradigms in an Age of
Globalization: PragmaticStrategiesfor the Development of Clinical Legal Aid in China,
24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S56 (2002) ("[I]nternational assistance's understandable focus
on more familiar kinds of legal aid institutions and activities can unintentionally
impede the development of indigenous legal aid practices and institutions that might
ultimately be better suited for the particular domestic environment.").
251.
See James Richter, Integration from Below? The Disappointing Effort to
Promote Civil Society in Russia, in RUSSIA AND GLOBALIZATION 181, 196 (Douglas W.
Blum ed., 2008) (discussing Russia's use of Western models and NGOs and Russia's
vilification of these bodies as "puppet masters from abroad").
252.
See Julie Mertus, The Liberal State vs. the National Soul: Mapping Civil
Society Transplants,8 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 121, 127 (1999) (noting the lack of strategic
analysis of domestic sponsors as a central phenomenon in the subjective experience of
law and development work: "Moreover, just as 'experts' read their subjects, the
observed read the 'experts.' Locals carefully select the information they disclose to
visiting 'experts', calculating how best to serve their own agendas. Acknowledging
locals as subjects and not mere objects can be disturbing for 'experts."').
253.
See Mustapha Al-Sayyid, A Clash of Values: U.S. Civil Society Aid and
Islam in Egypt, in FUNDING VIRTUE, supra note 17, at 71 (noting that aid can create
dependencies and prevent domestic efforts from taking root); Marina Ottaway, Social
Movements in Africa, in FUNDING VIRTUE, supra note 17, at 100 ("[D]onor-assisted
NGOs of limited effectiveness may weaken potentially more effective organizations by
depriving them of leadership .... ").
254.
This effect of failed legal reform projects has been detailed in Africa,
Russia, Latin America, and even in nonauthoritarian settings such as India and
Mexico. See, e.g., Diane Davis, Undermining the Rule of Law: Democritization and the
Dark Side of Police Reform in Mexico, 48 LATIN AM. POL. & SOc'Y 55, 58-59 (2006)
("[D]emocratization of the state ... seems to have contributed to the emergence of new
and more vicious intrastate and bureaucratic conflicts.... The result has been rising
criminality, a dissatisfied civil society, and an overall situation of public insecurity in
which every-day citizens feel compelled to take the law into their own hands."); Jorge
L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 113 (2003)
("[D]evelopment scholars accepted their inability to challenge the existing political
deal. Cowed by fears of lawless societies out of control, absent a well-maintained formal
discourse of law's above-politics authority, developmentalists desisted."); Timothy Frye,
Keeping Shop: The Value of the Rule of Law in Warsaw and Moscow, in ASSESSING THE
VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 229, 229 (Peter Murrell ed., 2001) ("Perhaps
nowhere is the need for strengthening the rule of law greater than in the
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negative backlash against the international reputation of American
2 55
lawyers and scholars.
Even in purely academic settings, the strong tendency to
represent American legal experience as providing a "model" rather
than a set of conflicting experiences and contested debates transmits
256
a shallow comprehension of the richness of American legal history.
For example, despite long-standing critiques of American legal
education and bar associations, such legal institutions are held out as
universal goods that have a definitively positive impact on the quality
of lawyers in any context. 257 Even for those elements of American law
related to producing public interest lawyers or litigation, proponents
more often than not share idealizations, held out with democratizing
promise, rather than the difficulties and setbacks experienced
258
domestically during long and often cyclical political struggle.

postcommunist world. Deserved or not, many of the former republics of the Soviet
Union have quickly acquired a reputation as mainstays of 'bandit capitalism'....");
Marc Galanter & Jayanth Krishnan, Debased Informalism, in BEYOND COMMON
KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 14, at 107
(discussing efforts in India); Yash Ghai, Law, Development and African Scholarship,50
MOD. L. REV. 750, 766-70 (1987) (describing the effects of law and development in
Africa and some of the mistaken assumptions that were part of it); Jeffrey Kahn, The
Search for the Rule of Law in Russia, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 353, 358 (2006) ("The rule of
law is not the sort of institution that can be established by putting pen to paper or
setting bricks on mortar. That has been a painful, and painfully expensive, lesson for
Russian would-be reformers ..
").
255.
The highest profile trip by an American legal scholar in the post-Mao era
was made by Ronald Dworkin in 2002. Dworkin's critical comments on Chinese legal
academia inspired a heated backlash in China. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously in Beijing, 49 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 5 (2002) (recounting his trip to China and
commenting on the status of human rights); Liufang Fang, Taking Academic Games
Seriously, 3 PERSPECTIVES 1 (2002) (criticizing Professor Dworkin's misguided
conception that the purpose behind his invitation "was to trigger a serious debate about
individual rights"); Yanan Peng, Taking Dworkin Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES 1 (2003)
(analyzing and responding to Professor Fang's article).
256.
CLARKE, supra note 29, (discussing the inherent flaws of using idealizations
of contemporary American law in a historically and developmentally decontexualized
manner when making comparisons to foreign legal systems).
257.
See generally ABEL, supra note 112 (discussing the changing practices and
perception of American lawyers over time); JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE
(1976) (critiquing the American legal system as being overly stratified and discussing
how that has led to unequal distribution of justice); RAISING THE BAR (William Alford
ed., 2007) (discussing the effect of American legal education and practices on numerous
countries in both positive and negative lights). Contra DANIELS & TREBILCOCK, supra
note 216, at 115 (claiming that "the primary function of bar associations is the
regulation of the legal profession in the public interest").
258.
For example, clinical legal education in America has grown in response to
the very real pedagogical needs. However, clinical legal education as promoted abroad
often presents a highly idealized version of its still marginal place in American legal
education. This distortion leads to an over-promotion of clinical legal education as a
motor force for positive social change. See, e.g., James Kraus, Legal Education in the
People's Republic of China, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 75, 106-07 (1989) (describing
the role of clinics in legal education in China); Jay Pottenger, The Role of [Clinical]
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This criticism does not mean that such foreign exchanges should
be abandoned or such interest in collaborations ignored. America
should enthusiastically take advantage of these existing investments
and pathways. Like most of our foreign legal engagements, these
relationships need to be remodeled along a fresh dialogic model. By
removing the presumptions of export and superiority from these
interactions, American can better inform the foreign interrogation of
the American legal experience, while at the same time take
advantage of the insight that outside expertise can produce for
domestic legal debates. 259 This allows America to receive critical
feedback on its actual legal quandaries while enabling foreign
reformers to situate the complexity of its historical debates within the
complicated reform politics of their own countries.
Turning this critique to America's own view of foreign legal
reform, the mirrored lens produced by law and development disables
America's strategic interpretation of foreign legal developments. The
easy analytic commensurability that law and development's
formalism inspires often creates a false confidence that foreign legal
systems are full of analogs to American common law actors,
institutions, and logics. 260 More, this formalism also causes foreign
legal developments to be interpreted based upon what they26 1would
mean in our legal context, especially in the foreign judiciaries.
To directly confront a thorny example, attempts to export
American public impact litigation abroad have been encouraged by
the often episodic acts of individual judges. Notably, the vast majority
of the world is heavily influenced by the civil or Soviet legal traditions
that do not operate on the same constitutional or jurisprudential

Legal Education in Legal Reform in the People's Republic of China: Chicken, Egg-or
Fox?, 6 INT'L J. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 65, 68-70 (2004) (describing China's evolving
clinical legal education system and the way United States encourages it, for example,
through conferences and demonstrations).
WILLIAM ALFORD & LIUFANG FANG, LEGAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN
259.
THE 1990'S 52 (1994).
260.
See CLARKE, supra note 90, at 110-11 (discussing misconceptions about
what kind of legal system is truly needed in developing countries); see also Donald C.
Clarke, How Do We Know When an Enterprise Exists? Unanswerable Questions and
Legal Polycentricity in China, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 50, 52 (2005) (discussing the
confusion that arises when Americans try to determine Chinese corporate status by
analog to American corporate law).
See JODI FINKEL, JUDICIAL REFORM AS POLITICAL INSURANCE 4-6 (2008)
261.
(evaluating judicial reforms in Latin America based on aspects of a judiciary found in
America, including whether or not the reforms furthered the rule of law, checks and
balances in government, and a strong, independent judiciary); see also WILLIAM
PRILLAMAN, THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN AMERICA (2000) (giving
the example of the U.S. Agency for International Development's suggestion to structure
Guatemala's judiciary system like that of the United States).
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26 2
logics on which public impact litigation in America depends.
Judicial aberrations are often greeted with wild speculation as
indicators of the ever imminent liberalization promised by law and
development in the given legal system-and usually just as quickly
debunked. 263 Simply the idea that foreign legal development will
follow the same path as our own inspires a host of predictions that
264
are self-affirming rather than self-critical.
In recent years, an even clearer picture has emerged concerning
the way in which law and development has warped America's
analytic lens. America has engaged in military interventions in the
Middle East based on the explicit justification that it has done so in
the past, and thus can again transmit its system of law to another
266
country. 26 5 The fate of these justifications already speaks for itself.

262.
Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Courts in New Democracies, 2 GLOBAL
JURIST 15 (2002); Benjamin Liebman, China's Courts:Restricted Reform, 191 CHINA Q.
267 (2007).
263.
Arguments about judicial review in China exemplify the misapplication of
American legal analogs. In a handful of cases, Chinese judges have attempted to
invalidate laws by reference to the text of the Chinese constitution. However, the civilSoviet hybrid Chinese judiciary is not governed by precedent nor is empowered to
engage in judicial review. The consistent desire of law and development work to see
such self-validating changes leads to an exaggeration of the importance of individual
cases as evidence of larger structural shifts. See, e.g., Keith Hand, Can Citizens Vitalize
China's Constitution?, 170 FAR E. ECON. REV. 15, 18-19 (2007) ("It would be premature
to suggest that the government responses described here herald the emergence of an
institutionalized and independent legal process for constitutional review."); Thomas E.
Kellogg, Courageous Explorers? Education Litigation and Judicial Innovation in
China, 20 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 141, 142-44 (2007) (suggesting that a series of lawsuits
against educational institutions, some of which include striking down regulations, have
extremely broad implications about Chinese law). Contra Stephanie Balme, The
Judicialisationof Politics and the Politicisationof the Judiciary in China, 5 GLOBAL
JURIST 1 (2005).
264.
This predictive distortion is a problem in our relationship with China,
where we have become accustomed to presuming future liberalization, from the state
banking reform to the revaluation of the Yuan to the impact of China's joining the
WTO.
265.
See generally MASON, supra note 75 (outlining the failure of Western
intervention in Afghanistan and some of the misconceptions that contributed to it).
266.
See Ahmed, supra note 75, at 49 (discussing Western misconceptions about
law in the Middle East and "challenging the stranglehold of conventional stereotypes in
Western popular media and even academic literature regarding the supposed rigidity
and regressive nature of Islamic law and 'ulama"); see also Ash U. Bli, Justice Under
Occupation:Rule of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L.
431, 433 (2005) ("[O]ngoing repression and violation of rights in Iraq in the initial postconflict period have already seriously diminished Iraqi and international public
confidence in the prospects for the rule of law in Iraq."); David Mednicoff, Middle East
Dilemmas, in PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD, supra note 26, at 269 (discussing
the general failure of rule of law projects in post-invasion American reconstruction
projects); Jason Brownlee, Imperial Designs, Empirical Dilemmas: Why Foreign-Led
State Building Fails 4 (Ctr. on Democracy, Dev., & the Rule of Law, Working Paper No.
40, 2005) ("Unless architects of interventionist democratization contend with the root
causes of failed nation building, they risk exacerbating the very instabilities they seek
to remedy.").
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With some irony, we should remember that the only other
modern

country

to

so systemically misjudge foreign legal
developments through an export-oriented legal culture was the Soviet
Union. 267 Notably, there are many other historical precedents that
show how legal idealism has too easily, and too often, led
2 68
international history down dark paths.
However one feels about what the proper normative or strategic

reaction should be to particular foreign legal developments, such an

assessment should avoid the distortions of overstating the larger
meaning of instrumental legal developments or the alienation of
foreign interlocutors by offering up orthogonal legal models that
continue to disappoint. The sum effect of these dynamics is the
widespread persistence of a warped lens through which we view
foreign legal developments. We recurrently force foreign legal
developments to fit the demands of sustaining the presumptions of
law and development to an ever changing, complex global landscape.

Insofar as we take seriously the proposition that the twenty-first
century will be one of competition, we must not presume that foreign
legal systems are converging toward our own legal developments.
All of this begs one question: if law and development is
intractably flawed, what should the basis of our relationship to
foreign legal systems be? Here, this Article offers an answer-a selfinterested return to comparative law, not as the isolated study of
foreign legal systems, but to its full flower as a widespread
commitment to comparativism throughout American legal culture.

267.
See generally PENELOPE NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS (2007)
(describing the how the Soviet Union tried to transplant its legal system in Vietnam,
but explaining that the Vietnamese legal system has been shaped based on its own
politics). For an examination of the role of law in Maoist development failures, see
generally Elisabeth Croll, The Negotiation of Knowledge and Ignorance in China's
Development Strategy, in HOBART, supra note 84, at 176-77 (discussing the state's
reduced ability to control knowledge after 1976 reforms) and also Gregory J. Massell,
Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: The Case of
Soviet Central Asia, 2 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 179, 228 (1968) (describing Soviet attempts at
reforming Central Asian law and suggesting that these efforts are a valuable case
study for "the identification and evaluation of factors that deter-mine the role, and the
success or failure of law as an instrument of revolutionary change"). See generally
JAMES SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE (1998) (giving a general overveiw of the failure of
top-down social engineering projects carried out by socialist and communist
governments).
268.
LAURA NADER & UGO MATTEI, PLUNDER (2008) (cataloging historical
invocations of the rule of law that were used to justify interventions abroad, often with
disastrous consequences).
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V. THE DOMESTIC LIABILITIES OF ANTI-COMPARATIVISM

Given that the putative subject of law and development is the
actions and efforts of American lawyers abroad, it might seem
natural that such debates are most often considered distinct from the
domestic concerns of American law. However, the early history of law
and development demonstrates how intimately tied the origins of
American efforts to shape foreign legal systems were to the
progressive abandonment of comparative methods in American law
domestically. The loss this transition caused in terms of domestic
legal innovation during the twentieth century is difficult to measure
retrospectively. However, it is increasingly evident that as the
twenty-first century unfolds, the anti-comparativism of law and
development is an ever progressing liability in our comparative
capacity for legal innovation.
In turn, this Part demonstrates that law and development has
repeatedly sought to solve legal problems abroad that have no fixed
answer within the American legal community. Further, such legal
challenges are now part of an increasingly common global legal
terrain that foreign legal experience collectively and individually
confronts. Despite this, foreign legal experience has primarily been
used in American debates to manufacture unilluminating proxies
that recycle what are in essence political debates. This Part examines
how the atrophied state of American comparative law is reflected in
the contemporary debate on judicial citation of foreign legal
precedents. The limitations of this debate lead to several suggestions
about how comparative law can be reinvigorated domestically in our
legislative and administrative bodies, as well as in American law
schools.
A. Ignoring Foreign Legal Experience in an Age
of Common Legal Problems
Legal historians often point out that the development of
American law has more often than not been one of contentious
conflict and bitter acrimony. The very nature of legal change has been
a hot topic in recent years, with great interest given to the
relationship between law and social movements, or ideas of popular
constitutionalism. 269 All of these debates affirm how diverse

269.
See MERRY, supra note 96, at 4 ("[I1n the long run the law incorporates
resistance, defining the terms and the strategies within which resistance takes place
and establishing itself as the fundamental terrain for challenges to the existing social
order.").
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American legal values can be, especially over time, but also how little
is understood about the number of America's own legal institutions
that evolved over time. 270 Imagine the variety of answers that would
emerge from any grouping of American lawyers if one were to ask
them how domestic legal change happens, much less how to best
provoke it. The diversity of such answers to essentially a key but
unresolved issue in contemporary American debates resounds with
loud dissonance when compared with attempts to export idealized
models of American law.
It is not then surprising that throughout the history of law and
development we have repeatedly found ourselves trying to solve
problems abroad that continue to be contested or unsettled at home.
Several scholars have noted the irony that those sectors of the
American legal community most unsuccessful in domestic legal
debates in any given historical era often are those most active in law
27 1
and development efforts abroad.
In recent years, this dynamic has been hard to miss, as even
foundational legal ideals such as the rule of law have become the
object of heated debate in American law. In the past decade, critiques
and defenses of our national security policies have revealed deep
domestic cleavages in what the rule of law requires. 272 Such debate
has called into question the very health of our tripartite system of the
separation of powers. Tamanaha notes that this throws a stark light
on our efforts abroad. He states that "even as politicians and
development specialists are actively promoting the spread of the rule
of law in the rest of the world, legal theorists concur about the
marked deterioration of the rule of law in the West, some working to
''273
accelerate its demise.
More specifically, law and development has long been at work on
legal issues that have proven intransigent at home. The structure

270.
See generally ROBERT DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971) (discussing conditions that
favor the development of legal systems that allow opportunities for public
contestation).
271.
See Kennedy, supra note 20, at 17-26; see also Garth, supra note 13, at
386-88 (describing the American economic community's attempts at promoting legal
and economic development in other countries despite waves of economic scandal at
home).
272.
See Kairys, supra note 20, at 326 (stating that some of America's post-9/11
detention policies run counter to the rule of law); see also Jackson Maogoto & Benedict
Sheehy, Torturing the Rule of Law: USA and the Post 9-11 Legal World, 21 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 689, 725 (2006) ("While still holding the United States out as the
white knight, victim of terror and beacon of democracy, it has become despotic in its
own territory, denying the application of the principles of the Rule of Law to
individuals in its own territory."). See generally Wade Mansell, Goodbye to All That?
The Rule of Law, InternationalLaw, the United States, and the Use of Force, 31 J.L. &
SOc'Y 433 (2004) (discussing the history and critiques of the perceived U.S. policy of
increasingly ignoring public international law).
273.
TAMANAHA, supra note 9, at 4.
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and process of our electoral politics has been under attack from a
variety of different perspectives as we struggle with the systemic
nature of voter apathy, incumbent entrenchment, and campaign
finance.27 4 Such debates invoke a host of problems when we link legal
reform to promoting "good democracy" abroad. 2 75 Even the area of
anti-corruption work has often taken for granted the very real and
ongoing issues of corruption stateside. 276 Beyond these more
structural concerns, challenging American legal problems as wideranging as basic access to justice-notably in indigent criminal
defense-to proper antitrust regulation have long been active areas of
law and development work. 277 Currently, the hottest topic in the legal
academy is the very desirability of our system of legal education,
a
2 78
model that we have for over a century sought to spread globally.
Even more fundamentally, at the heart of law and development
work have been attempts to shape the creation and regulation of
foreign legal professions.
Efforts to increase both legal
professionalization and independence in developing countries occur at
a time when the professional role of private and public American
lawyers has been the locus of contentious domestic debate. 279 Yet,
again, law and development work has rarely presented these debates
abroad or prompted us to ask how foreign systems already confront
such issues. The recent growth of interest in exporting American
public interest lawyering belies the ongoing domestic debates on

274.
Thomas Carothers, Promoting Democracy in a Post-Modern World,
DISSENT, Spring 1996, at 35.
275.
Thomas Heller, An Immodest Postscript,in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE:
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 14, at 391.
276.
See Kalin S. Ivanov, The Limits of a Global Campaign Against Corruption,
in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT 28, 28-36 (Sarah Bracking ed., 2007) (discussing
the anti-corruption efforts of the United States and European nations while
acknowledging that Western nations are not free from corruption themselves).
277.
See Richard J. Wilson, Beyond Legal Imperialism: US Clinical Legal
Education and the New Law and Development, in THE GLOBAL CLINICAL MOVEMENT
135, 140-44 (Frank S. Bloch ed., 2011) (describing three waves of "law and
development," the political contexts at each point, and the types of issues that were
addressed); see also D. Daniel Sokol & Kyle W. Stiegert, Exporting Knowledge Through
Technical Assistance and Capacity Building, 6 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 233 (2010)
(discussing the use of technical assistance to improve the efficacy of antitrust agencies
internationally).
278.
See, e.g., Annelise Riles & Takashi Uchida, Reforming Knowledge? A SocioLegal Critique of the Legal Education Reforms in Japan, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 3, 50-51
(2009) (discussing the implications of Japanese efforts to adopt the American postgraduate model of legal education for contemporary American debates).
279.
See Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A CriticalReflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 444-47 (2001) (outlining some of the debates over
American legal aid since the 1970s); see also Aziz Rana, Statesmen or Scribe? Legal
Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1665
(2009) (describing ongoing debates about legal ethics and the perceived legitimacy of
the American legal profession).
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and its methods or how
evaluating the nature of the "public interest"
280
access to justice is addressed abroad.
The dissonance inherent in exporting contested areas of law is
accompanied by the unproductive use of foreign legal examples as
warped proxies in many of our extant legal debates. 28 1 The cyclical
theoretical debates noted in Part III about property rights or
intellectual property are often regurgitated domestically as fodder for
reinforcing existing positions rather than opening up further selfinquiry. 282 The most obvious area where this occurs is the debate on
"legal origins" in law and finance, where a full cycle of assertion and
rebuttal has already occurred over the use of foreign experience to
assert straightforwardly chauvinist ideas about the superiority of
American law, which are in practice proxies for existing positions in
America debates. 28 3 This dynamic is a corollary of the cognitively
close-ended loop of law and development studies, where the study and
interpretations of the outcomes of law and development work is
driven by preexisting interpretive frames.
In fact, the unending cycles of critique and optimism inherent in
law and development work reflects the field's need to accommodate
the unresolved debates and tensions in American law. If law and
development ever succeeded in devising a definitive solution to such
problems abroad, it would imply that such solution was applicable at
home as well. However, given that law and development tackles the
whole gambit of contested issues at home when abroad, if the field
found such solutions abroad, it would instantly subject law and
development to charges of politicization. This is often the case

280.
See Garth, supra note 13, at 394 (discussing the debate over public interest
law in the United States and its intersection with law and development efforts in Latin
America).
281.
See Tamanaha, supra note 32, at 239 (citing our self-directed "battle of
ideas" using foreign legal proxies).
282.
See William P. Alford, Making the World Safe for What? Intellectual
Property Rights, Human Rights, and Foreign Economic Policy in the Post-European
Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 135, 146-47 (1997) (noting how this focus
is hypocritical, to the extent that it ignores American disregard for British and
European intellectual property laws in our early development).
283.
See generally Rafael LaPorta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON.
1113 (1998) (comparing the laws protecting corporate shareholders and creditors in
different countries). "Law and finance" as a field was shaped by this article's claim that
the "common law" produced superior growth results than "the civil law" because of its
treatment of creditors and shareholders rights. E.g., id. at 1115-17. For a full
treatment of its revisions, see Symposium, Evaluating Legal Origins, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 1413. For a parallel take on "comparative law and economics," see Ralf Michaels,
The Second Wave of Comparative Law and Economics?, 59 U. TORONTO L.J. 197 (2009)
(suggesting the arrival of an emerging second wave of comparative law and describing
it as "a humbler endeavor" that "shows greater respect for the complexity of law").

20121

LA WAND DEVELOPMENTAS ANTI-COMPARATIVE LAW

539

record of property
whenever the field notes the very partial track
28 4
rights or deregulation in development outcomes.
Instead, the extent to which American law has influenced the
rest of the globe through our economic preeminence only points to the
need to explore how such influence has resulted in inevitable hybrid
legal forms and hybrid legal solutions. Even the least influential
aspects of American law abroad, such as the jury trial, have been
tested and modified in ways that beg not for triumphalist affirmation,
reflection into lessons
but for a call for inquiry and comparative
28 5
learned from these variations' experiences.
Notably, these peculiar attempts to solve our problems abroad
occur at a time when it is widely recognized that we live in a legally
internationalized age where, not only are legal issues commonly
in solving international legal
confronted abroad, but cooperation
28 6
forefront.
the
at
is
problems
B. Foreign Citation and the Legacy of Anti-Comparativism
Domestically, debates over the citation of foreign judicial
precedent in constitutional decision making give the most attention to
the relationship of American law to foreign legal experience. 28 7 This

See Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the
284.
Implications of Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 INT'L L. & POL.
551, 554 (2009) (challenging the need for clearly defined property rights for economic
growth).
See, e.g., Jae-Hyup Lee, Korean Jury Trial: Has the New System Brought
285.
About Changes?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L & POL'Y J. 58, 59 (2010) (outlining different reactions
to the institution of jury trials in Korea in 2008); Daniel Senger, The Japanese QuasiJury and the American Jury: A Comparative Assessment of Juror Questioning and
Sentencing Proceduresand Cultural Elements in Lay Judicial Participation,U. ILL. L.
REV. 741 (2011) (comparing the Japanese quasi-jury with the American jury and
recommending that the United States use this point of comparison to learn more about
its own jury system); Spence, supra note 77, at 19 (discussing the Russian adoption of
jury trials and suggesting that more than just United States influence led to this
development).
286.
See Ming-Sung Kuo, (Dis)Embodiments of Constitutional Authorship:
Global Tax Competition and the Crisis of Constitutional Democracy, 41 GEO. WASH.
INT'L L. REV. 181, 182 (2009) ("This blurring not only necessitates international
cooperation to deal with transboundary regulatory issues, but it also exposes the limits
of the constitutional state's governing ability over traditional domestic affairs.").
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (comparing U.S.
287.
death penalty laws with that of other countries); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558,
572-73 (2003) (discussing the invalidation of sodomy laws in other countries); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("At least some
other countries, facing the same basic problem, have found that local control is better
maintained through application of a principle that is the direct opposite of the principle
the majority derives .... [T]heir experience may .. cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem."); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 734 (1997) (providing support for the decision to uphold an
anti-euthanasia statute by citing a euthanasia study from the Netherlands); cf. Atkins
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debate serves as an ongoing site of public contest, as it has expanded
outside of the legal profession to include even the judicial
enforcement of foreign legal principles in arbitral proceedings and
28 8
private contracting.
Proponents of foreign citation have invoked quite broad
cosmopolitan sentiments as they advance the education and empirical
values of foreign decisions.2 8 9 Such proponents argue for the "mindbroadening" practice of foreign citation abroad while they criticize
detractors as possessing an "insular" or "hostile" mentality misguided
by "arrogance."2 90 Some point to the historical scholarship cited above
that describes the more cosmopolitan legal culture in early American
291
history.

v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 322 (2002) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority's choice to invoke foreign decisions to support its opinion).
288.
Muhammed Elsayed, Contracting into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia
Enactments and the Free Exercise Clause, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming spring
2012)
289.
See Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American
Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, 4 INT'L JUD. OBSERVER 2, 3 (1997)
("Our [legal system's] flexibility, our ability to borrow ideas from other legal systems, is
what will enable us to remain a progressive legal system, a system that is able to cope
with a rapidly shrinking world."); see also Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World
Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771, 773 (1997) (referencing important documents
and developments from other countries and criticizing the fact that these "beacons of
the new era do not appear on American radar screens"); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization
in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional
Interpretation,74 IND. L.J. 819, 824 (1999) ("The impetus to make sense of comparative
constitutional interpretation is the premise that law is the source of, and the means for
the exercise of, the coercive power of the state."); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of
Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1309 (1998) (encouraging
comparison to foreign constitutions to broaden our understanding of our own
constitutional law); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119
HARV. L. REV. 129 (2005) (promoting an approach to foreign citation that is defined by
a "scientific spirit that relies not just on our own reasoning but on some rational
relation between what we are wrestling with and what others have figured out"); Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Lecture Delivered at the
University of Puerto Rico as Part of the Temas Juridicos Contempordneos IV La
Funcion Judicial: The Value of Comparative Perspective in Judicial Decisionmaking:
Imparting Experiences to, and Learning from, Other Adherents to the Rule of Law
(Feb. 10, 2005), in 74 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 213 (2005) (arguing that the U.S. judicial system
will be weaker "if we do not both share our experience with, and learn from, legal
systems with values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.").
290.
See BASIL MARKESINIS & JORG FEDTKE, JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN
LAW 167, 211-23 (2006) ("This ambivalence is not only confusing; it can also be
arrogant."). Other proponents cite the diplomatic benefits of such citation. See Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 109, 111 (2005) (suggesting that considering foreign law can be helpful
in constitutional adjudication and has a history in this country); Harold Koh,
International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 43, 57 (2004) ("Like it or not,
both foreign and international law are already part of our law.").
291.
See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our InternationalConstitution,31 YALE J. INT'L L.
1 (2006) (describing the influences of international law and legal concepts on the
American Constitution); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of
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In contrast, opponents to such citation interpret this practice as
forwarding a fundamental challenge to American sovereignty, 292 and
judge it to be the product of a deep disconnect between the American
judiciary and the American public. 293 In contrast to the more
apolitical, technocratic view of legal knowledge forwarded by
proponents, such opponents assert the intimate bond between legal
decision making and American cultural values as a bar to such
borrowing. 294 Opponents of foreign citation thus invoke many of the
parochial sentiments that the triumphalist presumptions of law and
development have so long inculcated-often while promoting export
295
work themselves.
At first blush, the argument advanced in this paper would seem
to neatly align with the pro-citation camp. It is indeed true that there
is something of value in the general promotion of cosmopolitan
sentiments that the debate has provoked. Yet, at the same time the
debate itself has put in stark relief the fecklessness of such debate.
Not only has the impact of such foreign citation been relatively

Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1335,
1336 (2007) ("[F]oreign law has deeply permeated our legal system from the very
beginning, not only in private law but also in constitutional discourse and
adjudication.").
292.
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-28 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting the majority's suggestion that American laws should conform to
those of other countries and describing many ways in which the American legal system
is deliberately different from other legal systems); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court's discussion of these foreign views (ignoring,
of course, the many countries that have retained criminal prohibitions on sodomy) is
therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however, since this Court... should not
impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans." (alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990, 990-91 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (disagreeing with
Justice Breyer's dissent that encouraged looking to the law of other nations to
determine what was a sufficient delay of a trial to be considered "cruel"); see also
ROBERT BORK, COERCING VIRTUE 51 (2003) (suggesting that international law
undermines a nation's ability to make clear laws and operate in the nation's interest);
Kenneth Anderson, Foreign Law and the U.S. Constitution, POL'Y REV., June-July
available at
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6657
2005,
(exploring the limits of the effect of Justice Breyer's Roper majority opinion and
discussing the role of international law in U.S. adjudication); Richard Posner, No
Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Law, LEGAL AFF. 40 July-Aug. 2004, at 40.
See RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004); see also Calabresi, supra
293.
note 180, at 1338 ('On the other hand, following precedent and borrowing foreign law
to decide cases on issues such as the constitutionality of sodomy laws or the execution
of juvenile offenders goes against the wishes of the American people.").
294.
See Judith Resnik, Law as Affiliation: "Foreign" Law, Democratic
Federalism, and the Sovereigntism of the Nation-State, 6 INT'L J. CONST. L. 33, 35-37
(2008) (describing how legal regimes are interconnected with the values and
preferences of the subjects they govern).
See Calabresi, supra note 180, at 1416 ("America is a special place, with a
295.
special people, and a special role to play in the world ....We seek only to spread
democracy and individual rights around the world.").
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marginal as an actual jurisprudential practice, 296 but the whole
debate is undermined by the atrophied state of comparative law in
American legal culture.
Proponents of foreign citation have been most vulnerable when
critics raise the basic question of whether courts have any capacity,
much less comparative institutional advantage, in interpreting
foreign legal experience. Critics of foreign citation also rightly point to
the near absence of comparative training in American law schools,
which has an impact not only on judges, but on the young law
graduates on whom they rely on as clerks. 2 97 Proponents cannot point
to any supportive institutional infrastructure for comparative legal
analysis even at the most elite levels of the American legal profession,
a fact that is far more important than the oft-asserted social
peregrinations of elite judges. 298 Many proponents respond to the
need to specify a rigorous mechanism by which foreign legal citation
could become a part of constitutional adjudication by retreating to
calls for moderation and, hence, leaving the comparative process still
299
relatively undefined.
Centrally, proponents' amorphous cosmopolitan invocations take
for granted that foreign judicial decisions are somehow self-evident in
their meaning for our own debates. In this regard, it is important to
note that many proponents have deep internationalist commitments

296.
See JACKSON, supra note 144; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice,
Supreme Court of the U.S., Address Before the Constitutional Court of South Africa: A
Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006), in 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575,
588-91 (2005) (recounting the Supreme Court's most recent decisions involving foreign
or international sources as an aid to the resolution of constitutional questions); Frank
Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 241,
243-73 (Micahel Ignatieff ed., 2005) (sketching a history of the U.S. Supreme Court's
willingness to look to foreign laws).
297.
See Basil Markesinis & Jorg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparativist, 80 TUL.
L. REV. 195, 195 (2005); see also Taavi Annus, Comparative ConstitutionalReasoning.
The Law and Strategy of Selecting the Right Arguments, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
301, 340 (2004) ("There is a danger that such comparative constitutional legal analysis
would devolve into a contest of determining who could produce a better anecdote.").
Note that few American participants in this debate cite the content of parallel debates
abroad. See generally JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON LAW SUPREME COURTS (Brice
Dickson ed., 2007) (compiling essays surveying judicial activism in different common
law Supreme Courts).
298.
See David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial
Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523 (2011) (demonstrating how the impact of international
judicial socialization on comparativism is vastly overstated and instead reflects the
actual comparative training of judges).
299.
See David M. O'Brien, More Smoke than Fire, 22 J.L. & POL. 83, 87 (2006)
(finding that the Justices' uses of foreign legal materials remain infrequent and very
limited); Mark Tushnet, When Is Knowing Less Better than Knowing More? Unpacking
the Controversy over Supreme Court Reference to Non-U.S. Law, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1275,
1302 (2005) (concluding that most of the problems with references to non-U.S. law
could be dealt with through more careful attention).
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that are not only tied to foreign legal reform work generally, but are
predicated on the same naive instrumentalism that is a core flaw in
law and development work. 30 0 Here in a domestic context, this
instrumentalism again agitates one of the very core challenges of
genuine comparative work, namely, mediating between the
30 1
As such,
contextual and the common in foreign legal experience.
proponents often do not recognize the fact that, especially in the

federal judiciary and legal academy, their own participation in
foreign reform work has historically ingrained the very attitudes
30 2
toward foreign law which they now seek to upend.
It is perhaps not surprising that the pressing issues of American

law's relationship to foreign legal systems are being addressed in the

constitutional context. Constitutional politics are central to American
legal identity, and the American legal academy and legal scholarship
30 3
However, even if this
are decidedly jurist-centric in their focus.
debate were to resolve itself with an earnest revolution in the use of

comparative analysis in constitutional adjudication, this would raise
doubt as to whether the judiciary is the best or most appropriate
sector in our legal system to inspire a broad revival in comparative
law.

For all the recent focus on constitutional litigation in American
public interest lawyering, historically, the American judiciary has
been the least consistent and aggressive branch of American

government when it comes to social change, especially at the
structural level. 30 4 Tellingly, proponents have limited their promotion

See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 100-03 (2004)
300.
(discussing judges from around the world coming together in ways that are achieving
many of the goals of a formal global legal system); Cleveland, supra note 291, at 9-ii
(discussing the role of law in constitutional analysis); Ruti Teitel, Comparative
Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV L. REV. 2570, 2584-87 (2004) (book
review) (outlining the dialogical approach to comparative constitutionalism).
See David Fontana, The Imperialism of American Constitutional Law, 56
301.
AM. J. COMP. L. 1085 (2008) (reviewing RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (2006)) (arguing that American
comparative constitutionalism has suffered from a projection of American
constitutional problems and debates onto quite divergent foreign legal contexts).
See MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 290, at 259 (noting the irony that
302.
American judges who so often seek to export American judicial practice have made the
partial and tepid turn to learning from abroad).
See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999).
303.
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 3 (1990) (noting the view
304.
that the judicial branch wields limited power to affect political and social change due to
inability to control the "sword or the purse"); Vivian G. Curran, Racism's Past and
Law's Future, 28 VT. L. REV. 683, 683 (2003) (arguing that historical propensity of
courts, even in democratic states, to legitimate and enable racist policies provides
compelling evidence that the current level of faith in law is misplaced); William E.
Forbath, Popular Constitutionalismin the 20th Century: Reflections on the Dark Side,
the Progressive ConstitutionalImagination,and the EnduringRole of Judicial Finality
in Popular Understandings of Popular Self-Rule, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 967 (2006)
(discussing popular constitutionalism versus judicial finality).
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of foreign citation to a narrow range of contemporary social issues
and have not included examining foreign judicial experience more
broadly to examine the structural aspects of the American judiciary,
such as judicial elections and appointment, which are seen as great
weaknesses across the globe. 30 5 Moreover, the emphasis on resolving
contested legal problems through constitutional adjudication involves
an inherent calcification of legal possibilities that runs counter to the
type of cognitively open-ended legal innovation comparative law
should inspire.30 6 Finally, the concerns of legitimacy and sovereignty
that critics have advanced are indeed most acute when one considers
whether the judiciary is the appropriate branch of government to
engage in comparative analysis, as a central challenge of comparative
analysis is disentangling the functional and expressive aspects of
30 7
foreign law.
C. Abandoning Law and Development, Reviving ComparativeLaw
For many decades, comparative lawyers like Stein have spoken
from their marginal positions to call for the renewal of comparative
law. 308 They point to the dizzying array of legal experiments
conducted abroad that demonstrate the salutary effects of
comparative rigor for understanding our own problems. 30 9 Yet, at the
same time a leading comparative scholar concluded decades ago that
the rising influence of American law in the twentieth century meant
that "[i]t is highly unlikely, however, that the traffic will flow equally

305.
For an overview of the debates over judicial elections, see generally Jed H.
Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (2010).
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing
306.
Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV.
1689, 1697 (2008) (discussing the American bar's unique role in governance through
administering the constitutional scheme on which American democracy is built);
Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118
HARV. L. REV. 29, 31 (2004) (discussing how the constitutionalization of democratic
politics means that states can no longer structure direct democracy in line with their
own ideas of participatory democracy); Robin West, Ennobling Politics, in LAW AND
DEMOcRACY IN THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 58 (Jefferson Powell & James Whyte eds., 2009)
(arguing that the adjudicated constitution cannot effectively regulate the processes of
politics).
See Annus, supra note 297.
307.
See Stein, supra note 5.
308.
309.
See Cunningham, supra note 6 (advocating increased comparative study of
Indian law); Tom Ginsburg, Studying Japanese Law Because It's There, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 15, 25 (2010) (citing instrumental and noninstrumental reasons for studying
Japanese law); Hugh Scogin, Civil "Law" in Traditional China, in CIVIL LAW IN QING
AND REPUBLICAN CHINA, supra note 6, at 53.
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in both directions, that there will be much Europeanization, let alone
31 0
Asianization or Africanization of U.S. law.
On the whole, this latter prediction has proven true. While
American participation in private and public international law has
kept apace, if not without its own controversies, modern American
lawmaking has been little impacted by foreign legal models. 31 1 In
part, this is due to insulation from the same type of adaptive
pressures felt by other nations and the relative success of America in
the twentieth century. Yet, as the world changes and America is
increasingly removed from some of the competitive luxuries of the
twentieth century, the lack of learning from foreign legal
developments represents a troubling liability reflecting the deep
entrenchment of law and development attitudes in our legislative
politics and in the American legal academy. It is in these two arenas
then that a revival of comparative law as an engine for legal
3 12
innovation must occur if at all.
Our legislative bodies are ideally charged with the proactive
collection of information and deliberation over legal reform, in
contrast to the reactive and episodic deliberation of courts. In part to
counter the overly jurist-centric focus of American legal scholarship,
Jeremy Waldron has long argued for the important capacity of
legislatures to engage in vigorous social and empirical debate,3 l3 a
point which many others also argue is central to the rule of law in a
democratic society. 314 And as the expansion of the administrative
state has come to dominate large areas of traditional legislative
activity, the same is likewise true for agency decision making.
As much as it may fall from ideal practice, the very messy
cauldron of political values and functional solutions that is at the

310.
Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
37, 63 (1993).
311.
Langbein, supranote 177, at 549.
312.
A claim for a revival of comparative law is not meant to make the glib
elision that comparative law as a field has not been without its controversies, failures,
and self-criticism. See generally RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(Annelise Riles ed., 2001) (compiling essays by comparative law scholars reflecting on
the character of comparative law); Giinter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: ReThinking Comparative Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411 (1985) (arguing that because of
comparative legal scholarship's faith in an objectivity that allows culturally biased
perspectives to be presented as "neutral" the practice of comparative law is
inconsistent with the discipline's high principles and goals).
313.

WALDRON, supra note 303; JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT

(1999); Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91 (2007);
see also Luc J. Wintgens, Legisprudence as a New Theory of Legislation, in THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LEGISLATION 22 (Luc J. Wintgens ed., 2005) (arguing that
politics makes disagreements workable in an effort to find the best possible legal rules).
314.
See Christopher L. Kutz, Just Disagreement:Indeterminacy and Rationality
in the Rule of Law, 103 YALE L.J. 997, 1029 (1993) ("The ideal of the rule of law is far
better served by lively debate than by wooden consensus because debate renders the
law's many values perspicuous in the actual exercise of authority.").
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heart of legislative activity makes it far more compatible with the
challenges of comparative law than judicial decision making. True,
the invocation of the lurking contagion of foreign legal values is more
strongly felt in the legislative than the judicial context, but this is
simply due to the proximity of the legislature to popular politics,
where such debates are not seen as driven by American selfinterest. 3 15 Whatever one's concerns are about legislative politics,
take a moment and consider the irony that law and development
receptive to
work has often aspired to make foreign legislators more
316
foreign law and engage in more "rational" lawmaking.
In many ways, American law and lawmaking is itself already
comparative in an often unrealized sense. One comparative
advantage that American legislatures possess is the robust potential
for social experimentation provided by our system of federalism.
Justice Brandeis famously used the phrase "laboratories of
democracy" to describe how localized innovations could diffuse
through legislative bodies. 3 17 Much of America's regulatory diversity
with
derives from experimentation in states and other jurisdictions
3 18
quite different material, and even cultural differences.
Yet, structurally America's legislative bodies have been equally
marked by the legacy of law and development when it comes to legal
diversity outside of its borders. Unlike many countries, America has
no comparative law bureaus in national or state legislatures, nor are
comparative experts often sought after to assist in the drafting of new
legislation. American legislatures not only ignore relevant foreign
experience in designing far-reaching responses to such issues of social
welfare and financial bailouts, but they often explicitly work to
319
portray legal responses as untainted by foreign experience.

In similar stead, American legal internationalists have also more broadly
315.
neglected legislatures in their scholarship as domestic legislatures are often resistant
to claims of universal expert knowledge that so often permeate such work. See, e.g.,
SLAUGHTER, supra note 300, at 5 (describing a world of governments whose regulatory,
judicial, and legislative institutions interact both with each other domestically and also
with their foreign and supranational counterparts).
316.
See LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL CHANGE: A MANUAL
FOR DRAFTERS 3 (Anne Seidman et. al. eds., 2001) (describing law as governments'
primary tool for transforming institutions).
G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism, and
317.
Scientific Management, 31 PUBLIUS 37 (2001).
See David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49
318.
UCLA L. REV. 539, 554 n.74 (2001) (describing the process of "law canvassing," or
looking to the laws of other states to help decide an issue).
William Alford, Professor, Harvard Law Sch., Address Before the Royal
319.
Irish Academy: China and America: More Alike than Either Might Imagine (Dec. 12,
2006) (noting that many countries are facing common issues of economic inequality,
environmental pollution and, more generally, "addressing their great common
challenge of ensuring an equitable society protective of the dignity of all").
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Take, for example, Kahan's argument on abortion rights, one of
America's most contentious social issues. 320 Kahan argues that
France performed its own successful example of "cultural
policymaking" by enacting a system of maternity care that serves the
symbolic needs of both opponents and proponents of abortion
rights. 321 However, if this solution were introduced to our Congress,
the identity politics of foreign knowledge would quickly become
apparent as association of the innovation with "French" culture would
severely decrease its chance of adoption. 32 2 Recent debates over
health care reform were rife with invocations of foreign legal models
and the bugaboo of foreign legal values, but without much input by
actual experts who knew the inner workings of such systems-even
from those arguing for reform more in line with foreign models.
Furthermore, the few legislative committees that do exist to
evaluate foreign legal experience are almost exclusively structured to
either promote law and development work or simply judge whether
foreign legal systems are emulating our own laws-presuming again,
of course, that we have in the past and will continue to influence such
developments. 323 Turning to the classic law and development defined
relationship, take for example the Congressional Executive
Commission on China (CECC), the congressional body specifically
conceived to "monitor human rights and the development of the rule
of law in China. '324 While the CECC funds quite sustained and
extensive research on Chinese law, it does so within the frame of
export, assessing whether China is or is not moving toward American
norms. 32 5 The CECC is headed by political appointees and, as a
result, the tenor of its hearings reflects scant consideration of any
domestic use for the research that the CECC carries out. 326 Contrast
this with the broadly experimental attitude that the Chinese

320.
Kahan & Braman, supra note 190, at 168-69.
321.
Id.
322.
Such is true for innovations even from the country whose legal system
American law is so often claimed to have reshaped and revitalized, Japan. See
FELDMAN, supra note 6, at 143-48 (describing Japan's preference for reforms based on
Japanese preferences); Toshimitsu Kitagawa & Luke Nottage, Globalization of
Japanese Corporationsand the Development of CorporateLegal Departments:Problems
and Prospects, in RAISING THE BAR, supra note 257, at 201 (examining corporate legal
departments in Japan).
323.
See generally Stanley Lubman, The Dragon as Demon: Images of China on
Capitol Hill, 13 J. CONT. CHINA 55 (2004) (describing congressional committee with
legislative mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in
China); see also, e.g., Orrin Hatch, Address, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW 3,
4-6 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford eds., 2001) (evaluating reforms in other
countries based on aspects of the American legal system).
324.
See CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, http://www.cecc.gov (last
visited Mar. 1, 2012).
325.
Id.
326.
Id.
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government has taken toward critically adapting foreign law and
even promoting a broadly experimental attitude in its own legal
culture-a legal culture so often held out as stagnant and reactive by
327
American legal scholars.
Also consider the relatively frequent history of borrowing by
foreign legislatures, both industrialized and developing, 328 and the
long and comparatively high-status traditions of comparative law
abroad, notably in Sweden and Japan. 329 Moreover, a change in
legislative attitude has the potential to promote innovative endeavors
such as legislative exchanges or cross-border cooperative policy
studies that are again far more popular worldwide than in America.
Additionally, consider how the collective budgets for foreign legal
reform sponsored by state and federal governments dwarf those
allocated for the study of foreign law. 330 While the funding practices
of private foundations and international agencies are outside direct
political control, legislative choices in this regard can help shape the
fundraising and cooperative culture within which they operate. Also
consider, especially in light of recent decisions to cut the already
miniscule support for academic study of foreign countries in recent
budget negotiations, 331 how central governments worldwide are
creating a range of incentives for individuals to acquire the skills and
332
training needed to carry out foreign legal research.

327.
See MARK LEONARD, WHAT DOES CHINA THINK? 71-75 (2008) (describing
China's conspicuous lack of progress on promoting the rule of law); THE SEARCH FOR
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN CHINA (Ethan J. Leib & Baogang He eds., 2006)
(containing essays considering how China might govern in a manner consistent with
deliberative democracy and continue to design and modify its deliberative democratic
institutions).
328.
Brian Tamanaha, A Pragmatic Approach to Legislative Theory for
Developing Countries, in MAKING DEVELOPMENT WORK: LEGISLATIVE REFORM FOR
INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION AND GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 40, at 145, 14749 (discussing the necessity of "borrowing" law in various circumstances and explaining
a particular application to Micronesia).
329.
See, e.g., Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, SWITZ. FED. DEP'T JUST. &
POLICE, http://www.ejpd.admin.chdejpd/en/home/die-oe/organigramm-ejpd/institute/sir.html
(last visited Mar. 1, 2012) (Switz.). See generally LAWRENCE BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM
IMPERIAL MYTH TO DEMOCRACY (2002) (giving an overview of the role of comparative law
in modern Japanese legal history).
330.
See Thom Ringer, Development, Reform and the Rule of Law, 10 YALE HUM.
RGTS & DEV. L.J. 178, 179-180 (2007) (discussing the budgets of various American
governmental agencies for promoting foreign legal reform). This is not surprising as
there is no active American governmental program to promote the study of foreign
legal development for domestic use.
331.
Kelly Field, Federal Budget Deal Spares Pell but Shrinks Research and
Education Programs, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 12, 2011), http://chronicle.com
article/Federal-Budget-Deal.Spares/127095.
332.
For a sample of government-sponsored foreign legal scholarship program,
see External Scholarships, UNIV. OXFORD, http://www.ox.ac.uklfeesandfunding/
prospectivegradlscholarships/external/#d.en. 16653 (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
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If legislative, and by extension administrative, bodies are the key
arena for reversing the legacy of law and development in the public
sector, it is American law schools that are at the very heart of the
private production of legal knowledge and the training of those who
come to inhabit public bodies. As noted in Part III, it is in law schools
that most American lawyers, international in orientation or not,
encounter prevailing law and development attitudes.
The legacy of law and development operates on a variety of
different levels in American legal education. While some law schools
actively recruit foreign scholars to visit, such scholars rarely teach or
participate in core classes, if they teach at all. This particular view of
foreign legal talent is one of the longest standing and most
fundamental aspects of the past century of America's law and
development work. Herein, foreign legal students are often explicitly
understood as future missionaries of American law and not as
reservoirs of useful knowledge, even when such students are scholars
333
in their home countries.
In comparison, it is also strikingly rare for American legal
academics to take extended leaves to teach abroad, especially outside
of traditional law and development agendas. 334 This one-way
emphasis is also quantitatively reflected in the number of foreign law
students in America in contrast to not simply the opportunity but the
335
actual encouragement of foreign study for America law students.
This state of affairs is at odds with trends showing how often
American graduates find themselves working in foreign legal systems
336
or with foreign law.
On a more informal but equally crucial level, law schools
coordinate and influence how American lawyers have a chance to
interact with foreign law. This coordination customarily includes
symposia, workshops, and lectures that are not only often a part of
fundraising efforts for law and development work but can even satisfy
continuing legal education requirements. Thus, law schools not only
pedagogically shape academic attitudes toward foreign law, but they
are quite commonly the locus of activities that enable legal elites to

333.
See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
PALACE WARS 7 (2002) (describing how national actors seek to use foreign capital to
build their power at home).
334.
Contra, e.g., Eli Wald, Notes from Tsinghua: Law and Legal Ethics in
Contemporary China, 23 CONN. J. INT'L L. 369 (2007) (describing the author's
experiences from teaching a legal ethics class in Tsinghua School of Law in Beijing).
335.
See Carole Silver, The Case of the Foreign Lawyer: Internationalizingthe
U.S. Legal Profession, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1039, 1046-58 (2001) (examining
experiences of foreign lawyers at U.S. law schools).
336.
See Laurel S. Terry et al., TransnationalLegal Practice 2009, 44 INT'L L.
563 (2010) (describing U.S. regulators' efforts to compete effectively in cross-border
legal services).
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engage with foreign law and lawyers, with bar associations close
33 7
behind.
In the simplest terms, law schools structure the material
pathways and subjective experiences that condition how most
American lawyers engage foreign law. To this end, comparative law
proponent David Fontana has already produced a wide-ranging and
thoughtful catalog of the various innovations that could productively
include comparative law in American law schools curriculums and
338
programming.
There has been some movement in American legal education to
adapt to the challenges that the internationalized and competitive
twenty-first century presents. What characterizes most all of these
efforts is that while they may emphasize the globalization or
internationalization of law, they rarely encourage comparative law,
and instead focus on international law. 339 Predominant academic
hiring practices continue to create incentives for aspiring scholars to
pursue international law that are far more attractive than incentives
for those pursuing comparative law or developing deep foreign legal
expertise. 340 These practices pressure those who study foreign legal
systems to justify their expertise solely in terms of facilitating law
and development programming.
Part and parcel of this condition was the mid-twentieth century
shift to conceptualize "comparative law" as a discrete sub-field that
strictly defines the expertise of legal academics. 3 41 This
marginalization of comparative law as the scholarly province of a few
select specialists, rather than as a shared sensibility among American
legal scholars, has been critical to the entrenchment of law and
development thinking. 342 While many comparative lawyers try to
bring foreign legal experience to the critical awareness of American
scholars, outside of a few specialized fields these attempts have been
marginal-often not due to the lack of erudition of the comparative

The ABA's role in law and development early in the twentieth century has
337.
only expanded into a now global presence. See ABA Rule of Law Initiative, A.B.A.,
http://apps.americanbar.org/rol (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
338.
Fontana, supra note 176, at 47-53.
See Law & Chang, supra note 298 (challenging other scholars
339.
characterization of foreign citations as a "dialogue").
See id. at 559, 574 (arguing that because academic institutions neither
340.
reward potential hires with international legal education nor teach international law to
their students, such training is not likely to be pursued in the future).
There has been a long debate about how to teach comparative law. For the
341.
anti-sub-field approach, see Roscoe Pound, The Place of Comparative Law in the
American Law School Curriculum, 8 TUL. L. REV. 161 (1934), Mathias Reimann, The
End of ComparativeLaw as an Autonomous Subject, 11 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 49 (1996)
and Max Rheinstein, Teaching Comparative Law, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1937). Contra
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Role of the "Basic Course" in the Teaching of Foreign and
Comparative Law, 19 AM. J. COMP. L. 616 (1971).
Dezalay & Garth, supra note 81, at 120.
342.
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lawyer, but simply because they are so few. 343 Even so, such efforts
run up against the reality that the sub-field concept has made
American legal scholars far more comfortable engaging in law and
and
instrumentalism,
work where formalism,
development
idealization are welcomed-and yet somehow hesitant to do the
difficult work required to thoughtfully adapt foreign legal experience
to the complexity in American legal reform. What the current state of
affairs elides is that when comparative law was at its height in
earlier eras of American legal history, it was as a commitment to
methodological comparativism, not solely a circumscribed sub-field.
It is affirming then that a number of American scholars have
begun to understand the need for comparativism. They have
approached comparative law not simply as a taxonomic or descriptive
endeavor, but as an effective tool with which to analyze and
contemplate domestic reform. Gillian Hadfield describes how the
United Kingdom is undergoing a revolution in the provision and
regulation of legal services. 344 She outlines how this experiment can
help provide answers to long-standing problems in America's legal
system.3 45 Peter Shuck comments on how the radical New Zealand
experiment in tort reform has remained curiously understudied. He
laments that ideal conceptions of American tort law have stifled the
intuition that "good feasible ideas are in short enough supply that one
would expect them to be seriously considered wherever ... they can
be found. '346 Amalia Kessler discusses the utility of integrating
insight from the French legal system into America's own rapidly
expanding administrative law bodies that are replete with many
parallel inquisitorial procedures. 347 The rapid pace of competition in
international capital markets moves Jonathan Macey to write about
how America is at risk of losing its "first mover advantage" in capital
markets by confusing historical opportunity after World War II with
superior knowledge and practice. 348 Macey's argument is perhaps the
most telling, as it directly places in the foreground the need for
comparative analysis as driven by the competitive dynamics of the

Comparative administrative law is one area that seems to be undergoing an
343.
internationalized moment. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (Susan RoseAckerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2011); see also Donald C. Clarke, "Nothing but
Wind"? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMP. L.
75 (2011) (discussing parallel aspirations for comparative corporate law).
Hadfield, supra note 306, at 1731.
344.
Id. at 1732.
345.
Peter H. Shuck, Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style, 27 YALE L. & POLY REV. 187
346.
(2008).
Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
347.
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181,
1260-73 (2004).
348.
Jonathan Macey, What Sarbox Wrought, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2007, at A9.
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twenty-first century. 349 Others have emphasized the basic
methodological advantages of comparativism in the field to which it is
350
almost always contrasted, international law.
The proactive and aggressive amplification and broadening of
these initial sentiments across American legal culture are necessary
to dislodge the now pervasive legacy of law and development's
negative influences on our domestic capacity for legal innovation and
adaptation.

VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has shown how law and development has influenced
and structured the twentieth-century American relationship to
foreign legal systems, and that its inherent qualities are antithetical
to the productive practice of comparative law. This antagonism grew
in strength over the course of the twentieth century as foreign legal
reform became firmly entrenched in the professional self-image of the
modern American lawyer and American culture writ large. The
paradoxical persistence of foreign legal reform efforts in the face of
their repeated failures was shown to be intelligible only when
understood as an extension of the cultural politics that asserted
America as solely an exporter of legal knowledge. Beyond simple
explanation, this Article has argued that this persistence has not only
had far from benign effects on American foreign relations, but that it
has left the state of American comparative law painfully atrophied
both institutionally and intellectually.
Two law and development practitioners reflecting on what they
saw as the "next fifty years" of law and development recently asked,
"At the core of law and development lies a central conundrum: why do
obviously desirable institutional outcomes not happen in the
developing world?" 35 1 Should we not be asking ourselves the same
questions about American law? Is such an answer apparent to anyone
concerned with our domestic and international challenges? The
presumption that this challenge lies elsewhere is central to
Tamanaha's plea for law and development proponents to recognize
that "legal development" is happening everywhere, especially at
352
home.

See id.
349.
350.
See Boris N. Mamlyuk & Ugo Mattei, Comparative InternationalLaw, 36
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 385, 391 (2010) (discussing how the emerging field of comparative
international law, like comparative law, satisfies our basic instinct to catalog, shelve,
sort, and understand).
Lindsey Carson & Ronald Daniels, The Persistent Dilemmas of
351.
Development: The Next Fifty Years, 60 U. TORONTO L. REV. 491, 511 (2010).
352.
Tamanaha, supra note 32, at 216.
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In this light, we should remember that history has repeatedly
shown itself unfriendly to societies that become too satisfied with
their own successes. 353 In an era of increasingly unpredictable
innovations, active adaptation will not be an option. 354 However one
diagnoses the near or long-term course of America's place in global
society, complacency seems as great a potential danger as any
external threat. For a nation conceived as a nation of values,
complacency arises when specific institutions or practices are
considered the final articulations of these values.
At the same time, this fundamental critique of our past efforts to
shape foreign legal cultures is not a call for isolation, nor should it3be
55
equated with a classic conservative critique of American empire.
Nor is it a fatalistic call for inaction that defenders of current
practices abroad so often conjure up. 3 5 6 Neither does this critique
presume that competition with foreign nations must be grounded in
any form of animus. 357 Rather, it recognizes that the world is
increasingly aware of our own internal struggle to adapt law to the
challenges of modern life, 358 and that there is a world full of nations
already vibrantly engaged in a legal dialogue both cooperative and
competitive, including many nations we have long considered lesser
359
"developing" countries.
If American legal history teaches anything, it is that America
has realized its greatest achievements when holding itself to its
highest standards and when recognizing, as one theorist phrased it,
that "democracy is a journey without end. '360 In too many important
legal and political debates, we only rehash our contested past,

353.
The literature on civilizational decline recurrently points to the value of
innovation, creativity, and self-critique, and the liabilities of hubris and selfsatisfaction. See IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY
(Rosenthal trans., 1967); OSWALD SPENGLER, THE DECLINE OF THE WEST (1917);
ARNOLD TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY (1934); GIAMBATTISTA Vico, THE NEW SCIENCE
(Thomas Goddard Bergin & Harold Fisch trans., 1984).
354.
See AMY CHUA, DAY OF EMPIRE, at xxi (2007) (finding that the decline of
empire has repeatedly coincided with intolerance, xenophobia, and calls for racial,
religious, or ethnic "purity"); JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE (2005) (arguing that
addressing increasing social complexity is necessary for the survival of civilizations);
JOSEPH TAINTER, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLEX SOCIETIES (1988) (emphasizing the
nature and quality of collective decision-making processes for modern societies).
355.
See, e.g., CLYDE PRESTOWITZ, ROGUE NATION (2003) (generally criticizing
the increasingly nationalistic posture of the United States in matters of foreign affairs).
356.
FERGUSON, supra note 20, at 285 (pointing out that doing something
different is not doing anything in the development context).
357.
LYDIA Liu, THE CLASH OF EMPIRES 1 (2004) ("[C]ivilizations don't clash,
empires do.").
358.
Issa Shivji, Law's Empire and Empire's Lawlessness, 1 J.L. SOC'Y JUST. &
GLOBAL DEV. 1 (2003).
359.
See LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW, supra note 249.
360.
DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE 357 (Peter Burnell ed., 2000); see also ROBERT A.
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 340 (1989).
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searching for transcendent solutions that are only possible in political
theology, not in the imperfect realm of human governance.
Even our proudest collective achievement, the birth of modern
constitutionalism, emerged out of hot debate, was forged from
compromise not science, and was hardly believed to be an end of
history. 361 Trying to take ourselves beyond legal borrowing is in
essence trying to take ourselves outside of the main engine of global
legal history. 362 If America continues to see its legal institutions as
end of history models, we may truly end up only exporting distortions
of all we have achieved as we ourselves stumble as history passes us
by.
Over the past century, American law has in fact had a great
impact across the globe. Our conceit has been that we understand
this impact fully and that we have been, in any instance, able to
control and direct this influence to predictable ends. There has been
great value in actors from around the world having lboked to America
as a symbol of democratic aspiration, but in our parochialism and
stagnation America is now more than ever jeopardizing that
dynamic3 63 and has even seen our once monumental influence of
364
global constitutionalism fade.
We can be proud of our institutions, but not merely as
monuments. We must continually assert any presumed leadership by
demonstrating a dynamic capacity to consistently improve upon the
realization of our values. We must not be captured by a backwardlooking satisfaction. In the twenty-first century, the only thing we are
guaranteed to control is how we adapt to this change-not how others

361.
See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS 19 (1999) ('The publication
of the Constitution in September 1787 inaugurated one of the most vigorous political
campaigns in American history.").
362.
See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW (2d ed. 1993) (outlining history of transplanting legal materials from other legal
systems),
363.
See Richard J. Goldstone, US Antagonism Toward the InternationalRule of
Law: The View of a Concerned "Outsider," 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 205,
206-08 (2005) (articulating concerns over human rights abuses and violations of the
rule of law by the U.S. government).
364.
See David Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United
States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (demonstrating empirically
the declining citation of American constitutional law abroad). See generally Heinz Klug,
Model and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the "Rise of World
Constitutionalism," 2000 WIS. L. REV. 597, 598 (examining both the enduring
contributions of American constitutionalism and the ways in which American
constitutionalism is being used as an "anti-model" in many more recent constitutionmaking processes throughout the world); Wiktor Osiatynski, Paradoxes of
Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 244, 244-45 (2003) (examining
experiences of constitutional borrowing and the limits to such borrowing).

2012]

LA WAND DEVELOPMENTAS ANTI-COMPARATIVE LAW

555

will adapt. 365 Thus understood, legal cosmopolitanism can be a form
of legal nationalism.
There is nothing inherently wrong with striving to be an
exemplar, as America has often presumed to do. Most importantly,
nothing in a revival of comparative law and a setting aside of law and
development means ending America's engagements with foreign legal
systems. In stark contradiction, it means that we should aggressively
set out to capture the mutual benefits that our own desire to explore
foreign legal experience implies for all parties involved. America may
have found and will find better solutions than others to particular
social problems, but we should not trade away our own innovations
and experience without reciprocity-great benefits can flow from an
open, honest, and yet self-interested intellectual exchange. Even if
America desires that our involvement abroad be a value-based
endeavor and not one that simply affirms our self-perception, we
cannot afford to suffer any comforting illusions or soothing
366
optimism.
In essence, we judged others at the cost of learning how to
critically judge ourselves. Every nation is at once in competition with
itself and in competition with history. In this context, and in the most
succinct terms, the future of American law is not in international law,
or even in global law, but in comparative law.

365.
See CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA 336 (2003)
(stating the necessity of preparing for the end of the American era).
366.
See J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, THE ARROGANCE OF POWER 256 (1966) ("[I]t is
not merely desirable but essential that the competitive instinct of nations be brought
under control .... ").

